摘要
在民事法律关系理论的视角下,人工智能的定位应该基于民事主体的基本理论展开。现有的主体理论以自然人为核心,主体具有权利归属和行为作出两种功能,以满足不同的价值或需求。由于人工智能的“自主性”在产生机制、适用范围和运作方式上都不同于人之理性,以人工智能作为行为主体也欠缺价值支撑,因此,人工智能并非行为主体。人工智能具有成为权利主体的可能,但是制度收益有限,体系成本很高,而且现有制度足以解决人工智能责任承担的问题,人工智能不宜成为权利主体。人工智能和法人并无相似之处,也不能“借”法人之“壳”而成为权利主体。所以,人工智能并非主体,只需作为法律关系的客体看待。
From the perspective of legal relationship theory,the artificial intelligence should be discussed on the base of the basic theory of civil subjects.The existing subject theory takes the natural person as the core,and subject has two functions,which is right attribution and legal acts.Since the"autonomy"of artificial intelligence is different from human rationality in terms of its production,scope of application,and operation,and artificial intelligence lacks value support as subject of acts,therefore,artificial intelligence is not the subject of acts.Artificial intelligence has the possibility to become the subject of rights,but the benefits are limited while the cost is high,and the existing legal system is sufficient to solve the problem of the responsibility,thus artificial intelligence is not suitable to become the subject of rights.There is no similarity between artificial intelligence and legal person,nor can it become subject of acts by the backdoor of legal person.Therefore,artificial intelligence is not civil subject,but only object of legal relations.
出处
《法治研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2024年第1期74-87,共14页
Research on Rule of Law
关键词
人工智能
法律关系
民事主体
权利主体
行为主体
artificial intelligence
legal relationship
civil subject
subject of rights
subject of acts
作者简介
殷秋实,中央财经大学法学院副教授,法学博士。
