摘要
中国证券监督管理委员会在长期执法实践中,逐渐塑造出"监督义务"的概念以追究董事责任,部分规范性文件及行业自律规定亦日益强调董事在上市公司治理中的监督责任。然而,监督义务不仅面临规范基础的质疑,而且在其内涵与适用条件方面皆存在模糊之处,既不利于促进上市公司的规范治理,又给证券执法埋下了隐患。结合我国既有执法实践与比较法上的经验来看,构建董事监督义务具有充分的现实必要性。我国应当在《公司法》修订中对其予以明确,尤其要涵括两项内容:其一,董事负有督促公司建立健全内部控制体制、信息收集与报告机制之义务;其二,董事有义务在发现公司存有重大异常时采取主动调查等行动。同时,鉴于独立董事及其他非执行董事参与公司治理时间、程度与法定职责不同,在其监督义务履行评价中应与执行董事有所区别。
In its long period of law enforcement practice,China Securities Regulatory Commission has gradually shaped the concept of"duty of monitor"to hold directors accountable.Some regulatory documents and industrial self-discipline regulations have also increasingly emphasized directors’supervisory responsibility in the governance of listed companies.However,this so-called duty of monitor not only is questioned for its normative basis,but also has ambiguities in its connotation and applicable conditions.This is not conducive to promoting the standardized governance of listed companies,and sows hidden risks in security law enforcement.Both the existing law enforcement practice in China and experiences in other countries show the sufficient practical necessity of the director’s duty of monitor.China should clearly provide for this obligation in the upcoming revision of the Company Law.Furthermore,the duty of monitor should include the following two aspects:first,the duty to establish and improve internal control,information collection and monitoring systems;and second,the duty to carry out timely and active investigations when noticing abnormality in the company.Meanwhile,considering the differences in the time period,degree and legal characters of their participation in corporate governance,independent directors and other non-executive directors should not be treated the same as executive directors in the evaluation of the duty of monitor.
出处
《环球法律评论》
CSSCI
北大核心
2021年第2期87-101,共15页
Global Law Review
基金
作者主持的2019年度中国法学会部级法学研究自选课题“上市公司董事监督义务研究”(CLS[2019]D43)的研究成果
作者简介
吕成龙,深圳大学法学院助理教授。
