摘要
“抚养权”虽然已成为日常表达并为立法所承认,但是对于抚养何以是一种权利这一问题仍缺乏学术论证。基于霍菲尔德权利关系理论,抚养权具有权力、特权和请求权相结合的三阶属性。抚养权在权利生成阶段体现为权力,在权利运行中以特权为核心情形,并在特权遭受侵害时衍生出请求权。就正当性而言,抚养权不能通过父母利益、子女利益抑或亲子关系性利益被证成,而应被视为父母完整人格的展现和自我意志的表达。此种意志是对善的真诚认知,并在亲子关系中实现反思性建构,因而排除了意志论的任意专断性。兼具交互性、过程性和伦理性的抚养权可为立法及司法提供融贯逻辑,并为家庭关系优化指明方向。
Although “custody rights” have become a daily expression and is recognized by legislation, there lacks an academic argument for why custody is a right. Based on Hohfeld’s theory of rights relations, custody rights have a three-level attribute of combining power, privilege and claim rights. In the stage of generation of rights, it is embodied as power. In the operation of rights, privilege is the core situation, and the claim rights can be derived when the privilege is violated. As far as legitimacy is concerned, custody rights cannot be justified by the interests of parents, children, or the relational interests, but should be regarded as the manifestation of parents’ full personality and the expression of self-will. This will is a sincere recognition of the good and a reflective construction in the parent-child relationship, thus ruling out the arbitrariness of the will theory. Custody rights, which is interactive, procedural, and ethical, can provide coherent logic for legislation and judiciary, and point out the direction for the optimization of family relations.
出处
《法制与社会发展》
CSSCI
北大核心
2023年第2期100-116,共17页
Law and Social Development
作者简介
陈曦宜,上海交通大学凯原法学院博士研究生、上海交通大学中国法与社会研究院研究助理。
