摘要
本文通过构建引入大股东掏空行为的委托代理模型,基于掏空视角探究高管薪酬粘性形成机理,并以2013-2017年沪深A股上市公司为样本进行实证检验,研究发现如下四点结论:(1)大股东实施掏空行为加剧了高管薪酬粘性特征,掏空程度越高,薪酬粘性特征越明显。(2)掏空程度对高管薪酬粘性的加剧作用因高管持股比例或大股东持股比例高低差异而产生突变,存在明显的门槛效应。(3)高管持股比例高于门槛值时,掏空程度对高管薪酬粘性的加剧作用更显著;反之高管持股比例较低时,则不明显。(4)大股东持股比例在门槛值以下,大股东掏空行为明显加剧了高管薪酬粘性特征;当大股东持股比例高于门槛值时,则不存在显著影响。
This paper constructs a principal-agent model to introduce the hollowing behavior of large shareholders, explores the formation mechanism of executive compensation stickiness from the perspective of hollowing, and takes Shanghai-Shenzhen A -share listed companies from 2013 to 2017 as samples for empirical test. The research finds the following four conclusions:(1) The executive compensation stickiness is aggravated by the hollowing behavior of the major shareholders, and the higher the degree of hollowing, the higher the degree of hollowing.Compensation stickiness characteristics are more obvious.(2) The aggravating effect of emptying degree on executive compensation stickiness is caused by the sudden change of executive shareholding ratio or large shareholder shareholding ratio. There is a significant threshold effect.(3) When the proportion of senior executives undefined shareholding is higher than the threshold, the degree of emptying has a more significant effect on the viscosity of executive compensation;On the contrary,when the proportion of senior executives is low, it is not obvious.(4) The proportion of large shareholders is below the threshold value, and the behavior of large shareholders emptying obviously aggravates the viscous characteristics of executive compensation;When the proportion of large shareholders is higher than the threshold, there is no significant impact.
出处
《会计研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2019年第4期65-73,共9页
Accounting Research
基金
国家社会科学基金一般项目“薪酬外部公平性对高管行为选择的影响研究”(17BGL244)
关键词
薪酬粘性
大股东掏空
委托代理模型
门槛效应
Executive Compensation Stickiness
Tunneling Effect
Principal-Agent Model
Threshold Effect
