摘要
本文分析了多个大股东对企业内部高管一员工薪酬差距的影响及其机制。研究发现,多个大股东的公司中,大股东恶性竞争导致了企业内部薪酬差距扩大,且这一结果在经过内生性和稳健性检验后依然成立。其影响机制是,多个大股东的矛盾僵持和治理低效,侵蚀了薪酬委员会的独立性,高管滥用权力提高个人薪酬,导致企业内部薪酬差距扩大。异质性分析表明,国有大股东的存在能减弱多个大股东对企业内部薪酬差距的影响;企业所处省份市场化程度越高,多个大股东对企业内部薪酬差距的影响越强。本文为厘清企业内高管—员工薪酬差距的成因提供了新的视角,对缓解高管委托代理问题及促进社会收入公平具有现实意义。
This paper analyzes the influence of multiple major shareholders(MLS)on the executive-employee pay gap and its mechanism.The study finds that the vicious competition of MLS enlarges the compensation gap between senior executives and ordinary employees,and this result is still significant after tests of endogeneity and robustness.The mechanism of the above result is that the contradiction of MLS and its inefficient governance erode the independence of the compensation committee in which case executives abuse their power to increase their personal compensation,leading to the widening of the compensation gap within the enterprise.Heterogeneity analysis shows that the existence of state-owned controlling shareholders can weaken the influence of MLS on the compensation gap within enterprises.The higher the degree of marketization in the province where the company is located,the stronger the influence of multiple major shareholders on the internal pay gap of the company.This paper provides a new perspective for clarifying the causes of the executiveemployee pay gap in enterprises,and has practical significance for alleviating the executive principal-agent problem and promoting social income equity.
作者
苗妙
汪小慧
MIAO Miao;WANG Xiaohui(School of Economics and Finance,South China University of Technology,510006)
出处
《制度经济学研究》
2022年第1期48-71,共24页
Research on Institutional Economics
作者简介
苗妙,经济学博士,华南理工大学经济与金融学院,讲师,硕士生导师,(510006)地址:广东省广州市番禺区广州大学城华南理工大学B10,E-mail:miaomiao@scut.edu.cn;汪小慧,华南理工大学经济与金融学院,硕士研究生,E-mail:2974819471@qq.com.
