摘要
本文以2008~2017年沪深A股非国有上市公司为样本,根据CSMAR人物关系数据库中的任职关系计算了每家公司所有董监高人员的接近中心度。本文研究发现,公司董事长接近中心度是识别公司控制权归属的一个很好的指标,且该指标对公司内部委托代理问题类型具有决定性影响。本文的研究结论表明:当董事长接近中心度大于特定临界值时,控制权掌握在董监高手中,此时公司内部发生的是第一类委托代理问题;当董事长接近中心度小于特定临界值时,控制权掌握在大股东手中,此时公司内部发生的是第二类委托代理问题。本文从委托代理问题的四个表征——股东委派、掏空、高管薪酬和公司违规被查处后的责任承担四个方面验证了上述结论。本文的研究结论有助于解决资本市场实践中实际控制人认定无序的难题,有利于监管机构依据控制权的归属对公司进行分类监管、进一步提升上市公司监督治理的质量和效率。
This paper calculates the closeness centrality of all directors and managers in each company according to the employment relationship in the CSMAR database,taking the Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share non-state-owned listed companies from 2008 to 2017 as a sample.In this paper,we find that the closeness centrality of the chairman is a good indicator for identifying who has the control right of the listed company,and this indicator has a decisive impact on the type of internal principal-agent problems.The research conclusion of this paper shows that:The chairman controls the company if his closeness centrality is greater than a critical value,where the first type of principal-agent problem occurs within the company;The controlling shareholder controls the company if the closeness centrality of the chairman is less than the critical value,where the second type of principal-agent problem occurs within the company.We verify the above conclusion from four aspects of the principal-agent problem:shareholder’s appointing executives,tunneling,compensation of the chairman,and the responsibility after violations.The research conclusion of this paper can help solve the problem of disorderly identification of actual controllers in capital market practice,help supervise companies according to actual controllers,and further improve the quality and efficiency of supervision and governance of listed companies.
作者
张鹏飞
陈锐钒
Pengfei Zhang;Ruifan Chen(School of Economics,Peking University,Beijing,China)
出处
《南大商学评论》
2022年第2期45-65,共21页
Nanjing Business Review
关键词
接近中心度
股东委派
掏空
高管薪酬
违规责任承担
Closeness Centrality
Shareholder's Appointing Executives
Tunneling
Compensation
Responsibility after Violations
作者简介
张鹏飞(1974-),江西上饶人,北京大学经济学院副教授,博士生导师,研究方向为政治经济学、发展经济学。E-mail:jxpengfei@aliyun.com;陈锐钒(1996-),河北邯郸人,北京大学经济学院博士研究生,研究方向为公司治理、社会网络、组织经济学。E-mail:ruifan@pku.edu.en。
