摘要
本文从信息披露违规视角探讨国企混改的治理效应并检验其作用机制。研究发现:国企混改有效降低了上市国有企业信息披露违规概率、违规严重程度以及违规频率。机制研究表明,国企混改抑制了信息披露违规动机,但对信息披露违规稽查概率没有显著影响;不同治理情境下,国企混改对信息披露违规的抑制作用存在显著差异。进一步研究发现,党的十八大以后国企混改对信息披露违规行为的抑制作用更显著;混改对虚假记载、推迟披露和一般会计处理不当三类信息披露违规行为均有显著抑制作用;混改有效降低了股票换手率。本研究既为评价国企混改的治理效应提供了资本市场层面证据,也为进一步深化国企混改提供了政策参考。
Based on the perspective of information disclosure fraud,this paper discusses the governance effect of mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises(SOE)and further tests its mechanism.The results show that the mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises effectively reduces the probability,severity and frequency of information disclosure fraud of listed SOE.Mechanism research shows that mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises restrains the motivation of information disclosure fraud,but has no significant influence on the probability of information disclosure fraud inspection.Under different governance situations,there are significant differences in the inhibiting effect of mixed ownership reform of SOE on information disclosure fraud.Further research shows that the reform of state-owned enterprises after the 18th CPC National Congress has a more significant restraining effect on the information disclosure fraud.It has a significant restraining effect on three kinds of information disclosure violations,which are false record,delayed disclosure and improper general accounting treatment.Turnover is lower after mixed ownership reform.This study not only provides evidence at the capital market level for evaluating the governance effect of SOE mixed ownership reform,but also provides policy reference for future SOE mixed ownership reform.
作者
谷溪
乔嗣佳
Gu Xi;Qiao Sijia
出处
《财政科学》
CSSCI
2021年第9期55-73,共19页
Fiscal Science
基金
上海市哲学社会科学规划青年课题“公司治理视角下的国有企业混合所有制改革效果评价研究”(2019EJB007)。
关键词
国有企业混改
资本市场
信息披露违规
公司治理
State-owned Enterprises Mixed Ownership Reform
Capital Market
Information Disclosure Fraud
Corporate Governance
