卖空机制真的可以抑制公司违规吗?——基于中国式融资融券的实证分析被引量：5

Can Short Selling Mechanism Really Curb Corporate Misconduct? Empirical Analysis Based on Margin Trading and Short Selling in China

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摘要已有文献仅仅考察了融券卖空对公司违规的影响,而忽视了与融券同时推出的融资机制的影响。对此,通过采用2007—2017年A股上市公司的数据作为研究样本,全面考察了融资融券机制对公司违规行为的影响。结果发现,融资融券的推出总体上助长了公司违规,并且融资交易与公司违规显著正相关,但融券与公司违规并不存在显著关系。进一步分析发现,公司经理人的自利程度越低,非控股股东监督力量越强,公司信息透明度越高,境外审计师参与审计,则融资交易与公司违规之间的正向关系越不显著。这说明,当同时存在融资机制,并且融资交易的规模占绝对比例的情境下,卖空机制无法有效发挥治理作用。结合中国特殊的制度背景,从企业违规的视角明确了卖空机制发挥治理作用的约束条件。 The existing research only examines the impact of short selling on corporate misconduct,ignoring the impact of margin trading together with short selling.By using the data of A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2017 as research samples,this paper examines the impact of securities margin trading on corporate misconduct.The study finds that the introduction of margin trading and short selling encourages corporate misconduct in general,and there is a significant positive correlation between margin trading and corporate misconduct,while there is no significant correlation between short selling and corporate misconduct.Further research finds that the lower the degree of self-interest of company managers,the stronger the supervision power of non-controlling shareholders,the higher transparency of company information,and the more participation of auditors abroad,the less significant the positive correlation between margin trading transactions and corporate misconduct.The conclusion of this paper indicates that when there is margin trading and when it takes absolute proportion,short selling cannot play governance role effectively.The paper specifies the constraint conditions of short selling in playing the governmence role from the perspective of corporate misconduct beased on China’s speical institutilal background.

作者武晨王可第 WU Chen;WANG Ke-di(Institute of Finance and Development,Nankai University,Tianjin 300071,China;Institute of New Structural Economics,Peking University,Beijing100871,China)

机构地区南开大学金融发展研究院北京大学新结构经济学研究院

出处《云南财经大学学报》 CSSCI 北大核心 2020年第10期62-75,共14页 Journal of Yunnan University of Finance and Economics

基金中国博士后基金面上项目“基于市场培育视角下的开发性金融机构在经济中的示范效应研究”(2020M670003) 天津市研究生科研创新项目“利率市场化、信贷资金配置和企业创新”(2019YJSB059)

关键词融资交易融券交易公司违规 Margin Trading Short Selling Corporate Misconduct

分类号 F832.51 [经济管理—金融学] F224 [经济管理—国民经济]

作者简介武晨(1995-),女,四川广元人,南开大学金融发展研究院博士研究生,主要研究方向为公司金融与资本市场;王可第(1988-),男,辽宁北镇人,北京大学新结构经济学研究院助理研究员,博士,主要研究方向为公司金融与资本市场。