摘要
本文基于2010—2020年上市公司数据,分别检验了高管之间的薪酬差距、高管与员工之间的薪酬差距对企业违规行为的影响及其作用机制,并检验了举报制度的设立对薪酬差距与企业违规行为间关系的影响。研究发现,高管之间薪酬差距越大,企业违规的可能性越大;高管与员工之间的薪酬差距越大,企业违规的可能性越小。举报制度的设立缓解了高管之间薪酬差距与企业违规的正相关关系,而增强了高管与员工之间薪酬差距与企业违规的负相关关系,从而揭示了举报制度在企业违规方面的治理效果及其作用机制。进一步的研究发现,在CEO未发生变更、内部控制质量更高、审计质量更低的企业,举报制度对企业违规的治理效果更显著。本文对于深入揭示企业违规的内在机制以及从根本上治理企业违规提供了证据与启示。
Based on the data of pay gap within listed companies and corporate violations from 2010 to 2020,this paper analyzes the different impacts and mechanisms of pay gap on corporate violations,separately from among executives and between executives and employees on corporate violations.In addition,this paper also tests the moderating effect of whistle-blowing for the relationship between pay gap and corporate violations.It finds that the larger the pay gap among executives,the more likelihood of corporate violations,while the larger the pay gap between executives and employees,the less likely corporate violations are.The introduction of the whistle-blowing system can alleviate the likelihood of corporate violations.Further study finds that the moderating effect of the whistle-blowing system is more significant when there is no CEO turn-over,also when the quality of internal control is higher or the audit quality is lower.This study has important implications to the fundamental mechanism and governance measures for corporate violations.
作者
牛清润
岳虹
崔学刚
QINGRUN NIU;HONG YUE;XUEGANG CUI
出处
《中国会计评论》
2023年第1期17-42,共26页
China Accounting Review
基金
国家社科基金重点项目(21AZD21)
国家自然科学基金面上项目(71772015)
北京市社科基金项目(17GLB016)的阶段性成果
关键词
薪酬差距
举报制度
企业违规
监督效果
Pay Gap
Whistle-blowing System
Corporate Violations
Monitoring Effect
作者简介
通信作者:岳虹,地址:北京市海淀区新街口外大街19号,邮编:100875,E-mail:yuehong2016@163.com。
