摘要
文章认为,后农业税时代的中国村级债务主要呈现为一种"项目内卷化负债",这一主体性负债型态的根源是分税制改革以来所形成的"项目治国"式财政分配体制。各类流水班车般的建设性项目资金,在经历县级部门的配套设计、责任分解之后,以偏离农民需求表达偏好的方式被大量散播到乡村,并在基层数字游戏和乡村面子竞争效应的共同作用下,造就了乡村项目依赖症,推高了村级负债规模。项目内卷化负债虽在短期内具有提升村级公共基础设施水平的效应,但从长期来看,却在乡村选举与治理领域产生了一系列值得重视的意外后果。
Chinese rural debt has mainly appeared as a kind of 'Project Involution Debt' during the era of post agricultural taxation. The root of this main type of debt is the financial allocation system known as 'Governing the State through Programs' which has been gradually formed since the tax-sharing reform. After the supporting design and decomposition of responsibility by authorities at the county level, various kinds of project funds for construction have beenwidely put into the villages in the way that deviated from the farmers' demand preference, accompanied by the common effects of digital games at grassroots level and rural face competition, these funds have created the rural project dependency and pushed up the rural debt scale. Although project involution debt has the effect of raising the level of rural public infrastructure in the short term, in the long run, it has produced a series of important unintended consequences in the field of rural election and governance.
出处
《甘肃行政学院学报》
CSSCI
2014年第4期49-64,127-128,共16页
Journal of Gansu Administration Institute
作者简介
孔卫拿（1985-），男，安徽宣城人，政治学博士，安徽师范大学历史与社会学院公共管理系教师，研究方向：公共财政、乡村建设与治理。
