摘要
为应对近年来的环保督察,各地普遍采取了运动式治理模式。其中许多地方投入大量资源进行了常见的集中动员整治,也有一些地方采用了极端而粗暴的一刀切关停方式。为什么在中央明令禁止的情况下,地方的一刀切行为仍屡禁不止?地方政府如何在一刀切关停还是集中整治间进行选择?本文以某县的环保政策执行为案例,提出"地方政府资源—任务情境难度"的分析框架来理解地方政府在环保督察背景下的行为选择。研究发现,在上级督察压力下,地方政府会依据自身资源与具体环境任务治理难度的匹配程度,选择采取一刀切关停还是集中整治方式。本文的研究发现有助于更好地理解科层体制的运作逻辑,对其他领域的督察运作模式研究也有一定借鉴意义。
In the past few years,China’s environmental inspections have attracted the attention of local governments and enterprises.Thus"campaign-style enforcement"has been widely adopted by local governments.Among such measures,many local governments have resorted to"mobilized enforcement,"which,like most campaign-style enforcement,devotes numerous resources to implementing environmental protection policies.At the same time,some local governments take extreme"one-size-fits-all"measures to forcibly shut down industries entirely.This article argues that mobilized enforcement and one-size-fits-all enforcement are two sub-types of campaign-style enforcement as they share some features,such as high-powered incentives and urgent actions.However,they are differentiated by their respective measures:mobilized enforcement will push the authority and departments to devote more resources to tackle the problems thoroughly and precisely,while one-size-fits-all enforcement will shut down enterprises across the board to avert risks during environmental inspections.In addition,the former is usually accepted by the higher-ups while the latter is strictly forbidden.Then why do local governments shut down enterprises across the board from time to time even though the central government explicitly prohibits such behavior?How do local governments choose between mobilized enforcement and forced across-the-board shutdowns?When discussing local government behavioral choices,existing studies on intergovernmental relations and campaign-style enforcement generally focus on structural factors,such as bureaucratic pressures and incentives.These studies implicitly assume that local governments are all capable of accomplishing their superiors’tasks as long as they are properly motivated.However,the assumption of sufficient capacity does not apply to all situations.Local governments have to take their capacity into account because in some circumstances they may face the problem of an insufficient ability.With respect to the literature on state capacity,this article proposes an explanatory framework for"local government resources and specific complexity issues"to understand local governments’policy implementation selections during environmental inspections.A case study of County A finds that in the face of top-down pressures,local governments will choose between mobilized enforcement and across-the-board forced shutdowns by taking into account the level of local government resources and the level of complexity;for a particular environmental issue,if local governments believe their resources can satisfy the complexity of the issue,they tend to adopt mobilized enforcement to fully cope with the problems;if local governments feel that their resources cannot satisfy the issue’s complexity,they tend to adopt across-the-board forcible shutdowns to avoid blame.These findings contribute to our understanding of organizational behavior and also have implications for other types of inspections in China.
作者
庄玉乙
胡蓉
ZHUANG Yuyi;HU Rong(School of Public Affairs,Xiamen University;School of International Relations and Public Affairs,Fudan University)
出处
《公共管理评论》
2020年第4期5-23,共19页
China Public Administration Review
基金
2017年度国家社会科学基金青年项目“地方环保治理中的选择性政策执行研究”(项目批准号:17CZZ020)资助
关键词
环保督察
一刀切关停
集中整治
政策执行
environmental inspections
one-size-fits-all enforcement
mobilized enforcement
policy implementation
作者简介
庄玉乙,厦门大学公共事务学院助理教授,研究方向为政府间关系与环保政策,yuyizhuang@foxmail.com;胡蓉,复旦大学国际关系与公共事务学院博士研究生,研究方向为环境政治学。
