摘要
避责行为是突发事件应急管理领域亟待关注的现实问题,其存在对于地方应急职能履行及风险防控造成严重损害。立足应急管理的实践场景,建立微观(心理)、中观(规制)、宏观(结构)三个层面理论分析维度,深度揭示官员避责行为的生成逻辑及链式影响。研究表明,避责行为反映了应急风险情境下的官员行动异化,是主客观因素共同作用结果,其具体表现为五大类别:转移和模糊视线、蒙蔽性操控、甩锅及责任上转下移、躲祸和选择性过滤、"一刀切"式应急回应。对此,需要面向突发事件应急管理的真实情境进行靶向纠治,包括:高标准彰显应急担当精神与唯实理念;设立地方应急权责清单,赋能基层履责;坚持精准问责与容错纠错机制并行;推动数字应急管理、优化应急平台载体。在提升治理效能的时代背景下,研究为应急避责行为的纠治提供一种解释框架和知识基础。
Evasion of accountability behavior is a practical issue in the field of emergency management,which causes serious damage to the fulfillment of local emergency function and risk control.Based on the spot scene of emergency management,this paper tends to construct a tri-dimension theoretical analysis,with micro(psychology aspect)-meso(regulation aspect)-macro(structural aspect)framework,to deeply unleash the forming logic and influence of officials’evasion behavior for accountability.The results show that the accountability-evasion behavior reflects the alienated action in risk situation,as is the yielding of subjective and objective factors.Generally,the behavior could be reflected in five specific categories:shift&ambiguity of accountability,deceived manipulation,shirking of responsibility or similar actions between subordinates&superiors,evasion and selective cover-up,"one-size-fits-all"style in policy enforcement and act of formalism.In view of these prominent issues,it must adhere to the principle of targeted governance with adopting multiple measures,including:resolutely eradicating the formalism;setting up the list of"power and responsibility"in emergency field;following the rule of incentive and"fault-tolerant&error correction"mechanism;promoting the digital emergency governance and the synchronous enhancement of emergency platform.In the context of strengthening national governing effectiveness in emergency management,this study provides a realistic explanation framework and knowledge base for officials’accountability-evasion behavior in local emergency management.
作者
刘泽照
Liu Zezhao(School of Government,Nanjing University,Nanjing 210093;School of Public administration&Sociology,Jiangsu Normal University)
出处
《中国行政管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2021年第5期138-145,共8页
Chinese Public Administration
基金
国家社会科学基金项目“基于政策模拟实验的社会稳定风险演化及预控机制研究”(编号:17BZZ039)
江苏师范大学人文社科基金项目(编号:18XWRS002)
关键词
应急管理
避责行为
风险
地方政府
靶向治理
emergency management
accountability-evasion behavior
risk
local government
targeted governance
作者简介
刘泽照,南京大学政府管理学院博士后,江苏师范大学公共管理与社会学院副教授,南京210093
