摘要
重污染企业环保投资不足会导致污染物排放超标和生态环境破坏严重,而宏观激励机制和微观监督机制能够促进企业环保投资的增加。本文以我国2011-2019年120个主要城市的上市A股重污染企业为研究对象,实证检验减税激励和独立董事规模对企业环保投资的影响。研究表明:国家税务机关对重污染企业实施减税激励以及企业扩大独立董事规模均能够促进企业环保投资的增加,并且独立董事规模的扩大能够强化减税激励对企业环保投资的促进作用。进一步研究发现,降低股权集中度有助于发挥独立董事规模的强化效应,但企业现金流较为短缺会限制独立董事规模的强化效应。本文运用成本收益理论、声誉保护理论、委托代理理论来阐述减税激励和独立董事规模对重污染企业环保投资的影响机理,为国家税务机关持续加大减税力度、证监会要求企业逐步扩大独立董事规模,进而更好发挥减税激励的宏观调控机制和独立董事的微观监督机制对企业环保投资的联合促进作用提供了一定的理论基础和数据支撑。
Insufficient investment in environmental protection by heavily polluting enterprises will lead to excessive discharge of pollutants and serious damage to the ecological environment,while the macro-incentive mechanism and micro-supervision mechanism can promote the increase of investment in environmental protection of heavily polluting enterprises.Taking the listed A-share heavily polluting enterprises in 120 major cities in China from 2011 to 2019 as the research object,this paper discusses and empirically tests the impact of the tax-reducing incentives and the scale of independent directors on environmental protection investment of enterprises.The study shows that the tax-reducing incentives of heavily polluting enterprises implemented by the state tax authorities and the expansion of the scale of the independent directors in heavily polluting enterprises can promote the increase of environmental protection investment of enterprises,and the expansion of the scale of the independent directors can strengthen the promotion of the tax-reducing incentives to the environmental protection investment of enterprises.Further research shows that the reduction of ownership concentration ratio contributes to the strengthening effect of the scale of independent directors,yet the shortage of cash flow will limit it.Based on the cost-benefit theory,reputation protection theory and principal-agent theory,this paper expounds the influence mechanism of the tax-reducing incentives and the scale of independent directors on environmental protection investment in enterprises,and provides a theoretical basis and data support for the state tax authorities to continuously increase the tax-reducing efforts,the requirement of the CSRC to gradually expand the scale of independent directors of the enterprises,and the full play to the co-promoting effect of the macro-economic regulation and control of the tax-reducing incentives and the micro-supervision mechanism of the independent directors on the increase of environmental protection investment of enterprises.
作者
谢东明
王平
Xie Dongming;Wang Ping
出处
《会计研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2021年第8期137-152,共16页
Accounting Research
基金
国家社会科学基金一般项目(17BGL066)的阶段性研究成果
关键词
减税激励
独立董事规模
环保投资
成本收益
委托代理
Tax-reducing Incentives
the Scale of Independent Directors
Environmental Protection Investment
Cost Benefit
Agency by Agreement
作者简介
通讯作者:王平,wangping@rmbs.ruc.edu.cn。
