摘要
与国外股权激励模式不同,我国实行的是业绩型股权激励,而签字审计师承担着对企业财务报告的监督职责,研究股权激励对审计的影响具有重要的现实意义.本文以2006~2016年我国沪深两市A股(A-shares,人民币普通股票)非金融类上市公司为样本,运用双重差分倾向得分匹配法和Lennox(2000)的审计意见购买模型,研究分析股权激励对企业审计意见购买的影响.研究结果表明,股权激励抑制了企业的审计意见购买,支持最优契约假说.进一步的研究发现,在区分了企业的产权性质和管理层权力后,股权激励对审计意见购买具有抑制作用,主要体现在非国有企业;管理层权力削弱了股权激励对审计意见购买的抑制作用,甚至当董事长和总经理两职合一时,股权激励甚至会强化企业进行审计意见购买.研究表明股权激励在我国上市企业的公司治理中仍然发挥着积极正面的作用.本文的研究丰富了与股权激励和审计意见购买相关的文献.
In contrast to the equity incentive model in international studies,equity incentives in China are implemented based on accounting performance.Since CPAs take the responsibility of auditing firms,financial reports,it is of great importance to study the effect of equity incentives on the behaviors of a firm's auditor.Based on a sample of non-flnancial companies listed in the A-shares market in China from 2006 to 2016,this paper studies the impact of equity incentives on the audit opinion shopping by applying the difference in differences propensity score matching method and the audit opinion shopping model of Lennox(2000).Our results show that equity incentives inhibit the opinion shopping,which supports the optimal contract hypothesis.Further analysis suggests that such inhibition always exists in thenon-state-owned enterprises and that managerial power weakens such inhibition.In particular,when CEO also serves as chairman of the board,equity incentives will strengthen the opinion shopping.Overall,our results show that equity incentivesplay a positive role in the corporate governance of listed companies in China.
作者
谢裕慧
刘文军
石德金
Yuhui Xie;Wenjun Liu;Dejin Shi(Sch001 of Managemem,Fujian Agriculture and Forestry University,Fuzhou,Fujian,China 350002)
出处
《当代会计评论》
CSSCI
2018年第3期102-126,共25页
Contemporary Accounting Review
基金
国家自然科学基金青年项目“审计师处罚的溢出效应研究”(71702032)
福建省科技厅软科学项目“财务重述与会计师事务所审计项目负责人配置”(2018R0015)
福建省高等学校新世纪优秀人才支持计划项目(2018)的阶段性成果
作者简介
谢裕慧,硕士研究生,E-mail:xyh845420456@163 com;刘文军,副教授,E.mail:nwulwj2004@163 com;通讯作者:石德金,教授,E—mail:sdejin@163 com。
