摘要
政府创新政策需要与企业内部资源状况相结合。本文旨在阐释财务冗余在政府税收激励研发创新中的角色与机制,运用门槛效应模型和Ⅳ-2SLS模型进行实证检验。结果表明:(1)税收优惠与企业研发投资表现为倒"U"型关系,适度税收优惠才能达到最优政策效果。(2)财务冗余的角色作用存在较大差异。可利用冗余、潜在财务冗余对于研发投资的作用不同,并具有协同效应。(3)财务冗余正向调节了税收优惠的政策效用。
The government’s innovation policy needs to be combined with the situation of the internal resources of the enterprise.This paper aims to explain the role and mechanism of heterogeneous financial redundancy in government tax incentive R&D innovation.We use threshold effect model andⅣ-2 SLS model to conduct empirical tests.The empirical results show that:(1)the relationship between tax preferences and R&D investment is a inverted U relationship,and moderate tax incentives can achieve the best policy results.(2)There are great differences in the role of heterogeneous financial redundancy.The use of redundancy and potential financial redundancy have different effects on R&D investment and have synergistic effects.(3)The heterogeneity of financial redundancy is positively regulating the policy effectiveness of tax incentives.
作者
李涛
刘会
田芮佳
万伟
Li Tao;Liu Hui;Tian Ruijia;Wan Wei
出处
《投资研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2018年第12期4-16,共13页
Review of Investment Studies
基金
重庆市社会科学规划一般项目(编号:2016YBGL121)
关键词
税收优惠
财务冗余
研发投资
门槛效应
Tax incentives
Financial redundancy of heterogeneity
R&D investment
Threshold effect
作者简介
李涛:重庆理工大学会计学院,教授,管理学博士,硕士生导师;刘会:重庆理工大学会计学院,在读硕士研究生;田芮佳:重庆理工大学会计学院,在读硕士研究生;万伟:重庆理工大学会计学院,讲师,博士。
