摘要
本文在区分人力资本“潜在价值”和“实际价值”的基础上 ,把分享企业剩余 (利润 )理解为企业中对人力资本“实际价值”的间接定价机制。人力资本所有者对企业剩余的分享比例取决于人力资本的自身属性以及社会制度环境。在现实企业中 ,不同属性的人力资本对企业剩余具有不同的分享方式和分享机制。有限合伙制基金中 ,管理型人力资本 2 0 %左右的剩余索取权通过合伙契约方式被明确规定下来。高新技术企业创立时 ,技术型人力资本被直接纳入企业股本中 ,以实际股份享有相应的剩余索取权。股票期权制和期股制中 ,经营者的管理型人力资本以“期权”和“期股”形式被间接地延迟股份化。在大多数的雇员持股计划中 ,雇员通过公司捐赠方式免费获得公司股票 ,使得其作业型人力资本或多或少地参与了企业剩余分享。
This paper points to the distinction between the “potential value” and the “real value” of human capital, and regards sharing the firms residuals (profits) as the mechanism of indirect pricing of the “real value” of the firm's human capital. The proportion shared by the owners of the human capital depends on their attributes and the social institutional conditions. In actual firms, human capital of different qualities have different approaches and mechanism as regards sharing. In limited partnerships, the residual claim of 20-percent share by managerial human capital owners is defined in the partnership agreements. In the high-tech venture, technical human capital is directly negotiated in terms of stock for the residual claim. In the incentive scheme of stock options or future stocks, the managers' human capital is arranged as “postponed stocks” to share the residuals indirectly. In most employee stock option plans (ESOPs),employees obtain free stocks as a contribution by the firm, so that to a greater or lesser extent,operational human capital takes s share in the firm's residuals.
出处
《中国社会科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2003年第1期73-82,共10页
Social Sciences in China
基金
上海市哲学社会科学基金资助
课题批准号 0 1FJB0 0 6。
