美国对华301调查及中国反制措施的法律分析被引量：11

The Legal Analysis of America's 301 Investigation and China's Countermeasures

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摘要当前,中美经贸关系正处于紧张时期,美国依据国内301条款对中国的政策、法律和做法发起调查,指控中国政府存在强制技术转让、歧视性技术许可、指示企业收购美高科技产业、盗窃商业秘密等行为损害了美国利益,并据此决定对中国采取上百亿美元关税限制措施。为将美国301调查措施在多边法律规则层面进行限制,本文重点分析了美国对华301调查中的违法性,并尝试分析中国对美采取反制措施的国际法依据,以期为中国今后应对美国301等单边措施提供有益的法律建议。 Currently,China and the US bilateral economic relationships are under an intensive period.Taking advantage of the Section-301 trade investigation tool,the US accused that China’s policy,rules or actions have caused serious damage to the US commerce.The 301 report asserted that Chinese government has imposed the US enterprises to transfer technology,Chinese technology license rules have led discrimination to the US enterprises,Chinese government orders the their own enterprises to acquire the US advanced technology industry and steel US enterprises trade secrets etc.Based on the 301 investigation report,the US further determined to punish China by issuing millions of US dollars tariffs to the Chinese export products.In order to restrict the US through the WTO multilateral rules and provide some useful suggestions,the article attempts to analyze the illegality of the 301 investigation and discuss the international legal basis of China’s countermeasure.

作者雷雨清刘超郑伟 LEI Yuqing;LIU Chao;ZHENG Wei

机构地区吉林大学法学院中国国际贸易促进委员会企业权益保护中心中国国际贸易促进委员会法律事务部

出处《经贸法律评论》 2019年第1期18-31,共14页 Business and Economic Law Review

关键词中美经贸关系美国301调查 WTO规则反制措施 China and the US Economic Relationship the US 301 Investigation WTO Rules Countermeasures

分类号 D996.1 [政治法律—经济法学]

作者简介雷雨清,吉林大学法学院民商法博士研究生,中国国际贸易促进委员会企业权益保护中心干部;刘超,中国国际贸易促进委员会法律事务部副部长;郑伟,中国国际贸易促进委员会法律事务部处长。

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1安佰生.WTO安全例外条款分析[J].国际贸易问题,2013(3):125-131. 被引量：27

二级参考文献19

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