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农村环境治理过程中的三方演化博弈分析

Analysis of Tripartite Evolutionary Game in the Process of Rural Environmental Governance
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摘要 农村环境作为乡村系统重要组成部分,对乡村振兴具有重要意义。随着乡村振兴战略的实施,各地逐步贯彻落实建设美好乡村政策。然而,由于农村环境治理涉及多主体,单一主体视角无法科学分析治理问题。因此,通过系统研究农村环境维护问题,构建包含农户、环境检测机构和乡镇政府的群体演化博弈模型来分析各方策略选择条件与行为,应用数值仿真研究总体演化趋向,并讨论各要素对三方选择稳定演化策略的影响。结果表明:农户、环境检测机构和地方政府三方在博弈中合作,在合作中博弈,各方策略选择除考虑自身获利外,还受其他两方策略选择的影响。此外,地方基层政府的策略选择在很大程度上影响着其他两方的策略选择。地方基层政府的奖惩力度也需适时调整,政府公信力在很大程度上会影响农村环境保护与可持续发展。 The rural environment,as an important component of the rural system,has significant implica-tions for rural revitalization.With the implementation of the rural revitalization strategy,various regions are gradually implementing the policy of building beautiful countryside.However,due to the involvement of multiple stakeholders in rural environmental governance,a single perspective cannot scientifically ana-lyze governance issues.Therefore,by systematically studying the issue of rural environmental mainte-nance,a group evolutionary game model including farmers,environmental monitoring institutions,and township governments is constructed to analyze the conditions and behaviors of each party's strategy selec-tion.Numerical simulation is applied to study the overall evolutionary trend,and the impact of each ele-ment on the stable evolution strategy selection of the three parties is discussed.The results indicate that farmers,environmental monitoring agencies,and local governments cooperate in the game,and in the game of cooperation,the strategic choices of each party are not only considered for their own profits,but also influenced by the strategic choices of the other two parties.In addition,the strategic choices of local grassroots governments largely influence the strategic choices of the other two parties.The rewards and punishments of local grassroots governments also need to be adjusted in a timely manner,as government credibility will greatly affect rural environmental protection and sustainable development.
作者 黄星积 孙延艳 王娜 HUANG Xing-ji;SUN Yan-yan;WANG Na(Department of Highway Engineering,Shandong College of Highway Technician,Jinan 250014,China;Business School,Shandong Yingcai University,Jinan 250104,China;School of Computer and Information Engineering,Hubei Normal University,Huangshi 435002,China)
出处 《长春金融高等专科学校学报》 2024年第6期63-75,共13页 Journal of Changchun Finance College
基金 安徽省科协决策咨询研究项目(2022jczx23) 山东省山东英才学院校级基金项目(YCKY23089)。
关键词 农村环境 政府监管 演化博弈 数值仿真 策略选择 rural environment government regulation evolutionary game theory numerical simulation strategy selection
作者简介 黄星积(1996-),女,浙江绍兴人,山东公路技师学院公路工程系辅导员,管理学硕士,研究方向:管理科学;孙延艳(1985-),女,山东济南人,山东英才学院商学院讲师,经济学硕士,研究方向:普惠金融;王娜(1996-),女,河南信阳人,湖北师范大学计算机与信息工程学院辅导员,工程管理硕士,研究方向:管理决策。
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