摘要
本文基于2000—2020年上市公司高管数据,论证了公司业绩与CEO离职率之间的逻辑关系,同时探讨了董事会治理的作用逻辑,为上市公司治理团队建设提供政策建议。研究发现:(1)业绩和CEO离职率间关联性比预期更强,绩效原因导致的CEO离职率占总离职率比重估计值在52%—57%,大于强制型或自愿型离职率所占比重;(2)CEO任期内都可能会发生绩效引致型离职,由于董事会评估CEO能力的准确性随任期增加而提高,CEO任期初绩效引致型离职概率更大,而任期末离职率变小,但下降速度比较缓慢;(3)董事会学习能力可以解释自愿型和强制型离职率的变动,但对绩效引致型离职率变动的解释可能会出现偏差,因为存在多种非绩效因素导致CEO离职;(4)董事会对CEO能力的了解比较缓慢且受到任期内企业绩效变动的冲击,冲击越大,董事会了解的信息越不准确,绩效引致型离职率越低。本文从新视角揭露了上市公司CEO离职的内在机理,传统的强制型和自愿型离职行为可能不全是真相,绩效引致型离职比较容易被忽视。长远来看,关注绩效引致的CEO离职可以帮助企业预防重大绩效风险,实现绩效的长期稳定增长。
In the process of promoting Chinese style modernization,various economic entities bear significant responsibilities,among which the role of listed companies as social and economic vitality entities is more prominent.How to improve the governance efficiency and effectiveness of listed companies is a focus and difficulty of attention in academia and the business community.The modernization of governance capacity naturally becomes a powerful tool for the operation and management of listed companies.So how can we achieve modernization of governance capacity?This question is more focused and difficult than the first one.This article,taking this as a breakthrough,points to solve the problem of modernization of listed companies’governance capacity from the per-spectives of board governance and executive team building.The key measurement variable is performance indicators.This is a core indicator for measuring market economic behavior,which is of great significance for understanding the level of corporate governance and management team capabilities of listed companies.This article uses the disclosure database of listed companies and the RESSET financial research database and the theoretical framework of Bayesian learning to explore the relationship between performance changes of listed companies and executive turnover behavior from two aspects of theoretical logic and empirical testing,and analyzes the moderating role of board governance ability and level in the above relationship.Based on learning theory and empirical analysis results,this article has four conclusions:Firstly,the rate of CEO turnover due to performance(52-57%)is generally higher than the rate of forced or voluntary turnover.There is a high correlation between the CEO turnover rate of listed companies and the board’s expectations of the company’s performance during the CEO’s tenure.Secondly,due to the intervention of the board governance,the performance induced turnover rate during the CEO’s term is dynam-ically changing.The key factor in this process is the accuracy of the board’s evaluation of the CEO’s abilities.In the early stages of the tenure,due to limited information on the CEO’s abilities,the probability of performance induced turnover is high.As the board’s learning ability and governance ability strengthen,the performance induced turnover rate will significantly decrease at the end of the term,but at a slow pace.Thirdly,both traditional mandatory and voluntary turnover behaviors can be explained by the strength of the board’s learning ability,but the explanatory power for performance-induced turnover behaviors is weak.The main reason is that there are many non-perfor-mance factors included in the performance factors,leading to a high estimated probability.Fourthly,the learning and governance abilities of directors in listed companies are constantly improving,but they will be affected by performance changes during the CEO’s tenure.The greater the impact of performance changes,the lower the confidence of the board in evaluating the accuracy of CEO’s abilities,resulting in a decrease in the board’s governance capacity.The more inaccurate the board’s understanding of CEO’s abilities,the lower the performance induced turnover rate.The paper reveals the internal mechanism of CEO turnover in listed companies from a new perspective.Traditional forced and volun-tary turnover behaviors may not be entirely true,and performance-based turnover is more easily overlooked.In the long run,focusing on performance induced CEO turnover can help companies prevent significant performance risks and achieve long-term stable per-formance growth.The specific suggestions are as follows:Firstly,listed companies should not only attach importance to traditional mandatory and voluntary turnover behaviors,but also to performance-based executive turnover behaviors.This requires companies to have a complete performance management system to ensure accuracy and usability in the performance evaluation and measurement process.Secondly,further enhance the decision-making position and governance ability of the board of directors of listed companies in com-pany management,and accurately evaluate the true abilities of CEOs and executive teams based on the board’s governance capacity,in order to achieve expectations and judgments on their tenure performance and turnover behavior,and ensure that the board of direc-tors adopts more accurate CEO and executive turnover decisions.Thirdly,no matter what kind of turnover behavior,it will have a negative impact on the operational performance of the company.From the perspective of corporate governance,how to avoid turnover behavior from an individual perspective is also within the scope of board governance.Therefore,establishing a sound incentive and restraint mechanism for listed companies,can incentive and re-strain individual behavior effectively,is the ultimate goal of board governance for listed companies,and it is also the key to reducing turnover behavior.
作者
张行
Zhang xing(School of Public Administration,Zhong Nan University of Economics and Law)
出处
《南开管理评论》
CSSCI
北大核心
2024年第3期213-225,I0039,I0040,共15页
Nankai Business Review
基金
湖北省社科基金重点项目(HBSKJJ2023137)
中央基本科研业务费阐释二十大专项(31512241202)
中央基本科研业务费项目(2722023EJ022)资助。
关键词
业绩变动
董事会治理
离职行为
激励与约束
Performance Changes
Board Governance
Turnover Behavior
Incentives and Constraints
作者简介
张行,中南财经政法大学应急与公共人力资源管理系副教授、博士,研究方向为组织与人力资源管理、公司治理。
