摘要
突破传统委托代理中最优契约理论分析范式,本文引入契约参照点理论,基于2012-2018年我国A股上市公司数据,实证检验了高管主动离职对企业绩效的影响以及多维薪酬契约参照点对二者关系的调节作用。研究发现:高管主动离职对企业绩效产生了负向影响;薪酬契约参照点正向调节了高管主动离职与企业绩效的关系,且外部薪酬契约参照点的调节作用更显著。进一步研究发现,高管主动离职对企业绩效的负向影响以及薪酬契约参照点的调节作用在民营企业中更显著。机理检验发现,高管主动离职通过道德风险效应影响了企业绩效。本文的结论丰富了高管主动离职经济后果的相关研究,拓展了薪酬契约参照点的研究范畴,为减少高管主动离职和提高企业绩效提供了理论依据。
Breaking through the analysis paradigm of the optimal contract theory in the traditional principal-agent theory,this paper examines the relationship between executive turnover,compensation contract reference point and firm performance from the perspective of compensation contract reference point and based on the data of A-share listed companies in China from 2012 to 2018.The results show that:executive turnover have a negative impact on corporate performance.Compensation contract reference point can effectively regulate the impact of executive turnover on corporate performance,and the external compensation contract reference point has a more significant regulatory role.Further research finds that the negative impact of executive turnover on corporate performance and the regulatory effect of compensation contract reference point on the relationship between executive turnover and corporate performance are more significant in private enterprises.Finally,it is found that executives’active turnover affect corporate performance through moral hazard effect.The conclusion of this paper enriches the relevant research on the economic consequences of executive turnover,widens the research scope of the reference point of compensation contract,and provides a theoretical basis for reducing executive turnover and improving corporate performance.
出处
《会计研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2022年第1期70-83,共14页
Accounting Research
基金
国家自然科学基金青年项目(71702171)
教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目(21YJA630005)
郑州大学人文社会科学优秀青年科研团队培育计划(2020-QNTD-01)
河南省哲学社会科学规划基金项目(2020BJJ056)
河南工业大学高层次人才基金(2021SBS32)的资助
关键词
高管主动离职
薪酬契约参照点
企业绩效
产权性质
Executive Officers’Active Separation
Remuneration Contract Reference Points
Enterprise Performance
Nature of Property Right
作者简介
通讯作者:任广乾,rgq1982@163.com。
