分析师实地调研与企业分类转移盈余管理被引量：3

Analysts’ Site Visits and Corporate Classification Shifting Earnings Management

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摘要文章以2013-2018年深市A股上市公司为研究样本,实证检验了分析师实地调研对企业分类转移盈余管理的影响及其内在机理。研究发现,提高分析师实地调研强度、提升其对业绩信息挖掘的深度可以有效抑制企业分类转移盈余管理;当调研信息质量较高时,分析师实地调研对企业分类转移盈余管理的抑制作用更显著。影响机理的检验证实,分析师实地调研通过缓解管理层的迎合动机以及发挥直接与间接的监督效应对企业分类转移盈余管理产生影响。进一步研究发现,分析师实地调研对企业分类转移盈余管理的治理效应在董事会独立性较低和外部审计质量较差的企业更明显;分析师特征异质性检验发现,非关联分析师和专业能力较强的分析师实地调研更能对企业分类转移盈余管理产生抑制作用。 The research paper explores the relationship between analysts’site visits and earnings management using classification shifting and its mechanism by setting SSE A-share listed companies from 2013 to 2018 as the sample.The study finds that increasing the intensity of analysts’site visits and enhancing the depth of performance information mining can effectively restrain corporate earnings management using classification shifting.When the quality of analysts’site visits information is high,the inhibitory effect is more significant.The examination of influence mechanism has verified that analysts’site visits has an impact on classification shifting earnings management by alleviating the catering instinct of managers and exerting direct and indirect supervision effect.Further analysis reveals that the governance effect of analysts’site visits on classification shifting earnings management is more obvious in firms with low board independence and poor external audit quality.This paper further finds that there would be greater mitigating effect on classification shifting if the analysts are non-associated and more skilled.

作者翟淑萍甦叶袁克丽 Shuping Zhai;Ye Su;Keli Yuan(School of Accounting,Tianjin University of Finance and Economics,Tianjin 300222,China;School of Management,Tianjin University of Traditional Chinese Medicine,Tianjin 300222,China)

机构地区天津财经大学会计学院天津中医药大学管理学院

出处《会计与经济研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2022年第3期33-53,共21页 Accounting and Economics Research

基金国家自然科学基金面上项目(71972140)

关键词分析师实地调研调研信息质量分类转移盈余管理迎合动机监督效应 analyst’site visits site visits information quality classification shifting earnings management catering instinct supervision effect

分类号 F275 [经济管理—企业管理] F832.51 [经济管理—金融学]

作者简介通讯作者:翟淑萍,博士,天津财经大学会计学院教授,zhaishuping2008@163.com;甦叶,天津财经大学会计学院博士研究生,suyesuye1234@163.com;袁克丽,博士,天津中医药大学管理学院讲师,yuankelikuaiji@126.com。