摘要
有学者把卢梭的自尊和自由两个概念之间的关系误读为相互对立的关系,即自尊的产生必然导致自由的丧失,并且根除自尊是获得自由的必要条件。本文试图澄清自尊与自由的恰当关系,即当自尊呈现为一种与其他人获得平等地位的渴望时,它与自由是相互支持的。这种对自尊与自由关系的新解读,也揭示了道德心理与政治制度的相互作用,并为卢梭为什么能够回避以赛亚·柏林对他的“极权主义”的指控提供了一个解答。
The relationship between amour-propre and freedom for Rousseau has been misread as rival,namely,the rise of amour-propre leads to the loss of freedom,and eradicating amour-propre is necessary for obtaining freedom.I try to make clear the proper relationship between amour-propre and freedom,i.e.,when amour-propre manifests itself as a desire to have equal standing with others,one's amourpropre supports one's freedom,and vice versa.This new understanding of amour-propre and freedom,reveals the mutual relationship between moral psychology and political institution,and provides a solution for how Rousseau can escape Isaiah Berlin's accusation of him as a totolitarian.
出处
《世界哲学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2023年第5期130-139,F0003,共11页
World Philosophy
