摘要
本文考虑消费者对质量差异化产品的异质性偏好以及环保意识,建立了消费者效用函数以及产品需求函数,构建了差异化竞争制造商及其零部件供应商之间的动态博弈模型;进而,研究了竞争供应链中制造商环保技术投资策略,考察了市场竞争对供应链均衡定价决策、环保技术投资决策以及消费者福利的影响。研究结果表明:拥有较高技术水平的制造商总是会选择更高的环保技术投资水平,但消费者也需为此支付更高的产品溢价;制造商环保技术投资会影响产品销售价格并有利于提升消费者福利,拥有较高技术水平的制造商总是有动机选择投资环保技术,而技术水平较低的制造商则不会有动机选择投资环保技术;市场竞争会导致供应商和制造商定价决策的变化,但此时供应商反而能够获得更多利润。
In recent years,with the development of the economy,consumers have higher and higher requirements for corporate environmental protection,and more and more companies have begun to pursue green,low-carbon,and sustainable development.For example,the three-way catalytic converter technology in the automobile industry can effectively improve the utilization rate of gasoline and reduce exhaust gas emissions such as carbon monoxide;Heat pump technology and frequency conversion technology in the air conditioning industry can reduce energy consumption.However,in a competitive market environment,companies also need to consider the impact of competitors’market pricing and environmental investment strategies when determining their own environmental technology investment decisions.This not only complicates the enterprise environmental technology investment decision-making process and the competition and cooperation game relationship,but also may lead to the imbalance of corporate decision-making incentives and the loss of corporate performance.As a result,by constructing three-stage game model between one supplier and two competing manufacturers,it is aimed to study how should manufacturers determine their environmental investment strategies and price strategies in a competitive market environment?How can manufacturers adjust pricing and environmental investment decisions to maintain their competitive advantage and maximize profits?And what impact will environmental technology investment have on supplier pricing,profits,as well as consumer purchasing behavior and consumer welfare?Based on the existing research,it is considered that the supplier supplies a core component produced by it to two differentiated competing manufacturers,and then each manufacturer produces a substitutable product with different quality,while two differentiated competing manufacturers also invest in environmental protection technology.First,the utility function and product demand function s are established base on the heterogeneity of consumers.Second,given the environmental technology level of two manufacturers,three-stage game model is developed to examine the impact of environmental protection technology investment and market competition on the supply chain equilibrium and consumer surplus.Through solving these models,the optimal pricing and environmental technology investment decision,product demand,and profit of both sides of the supply chain are obtained.Based on this,the impact of environmental protection technology investment and market competition on the optimal pricing decision and profit of member companies in the supply chain and consumer welfare is analyzed,and numerical examples are used to visually examine them.The results show that,facing the market competition of differentiated competitive manufacturers,the high-tech manufacturer should reduce investment in environmental protection technology and adjust product sales prices according to the degree of differentiated competition and technological level.That is,market competition causes high-tech manufacturers to increase product sales prices,and consumers have to pay higher premiums for environmentally friendly products.However,market competition will also cause the market share of high-tech manufacturer to be eroded by low-tech manufacturer.This is because some consumers with low willingness to pay will switch to low-tech manufacturer’s products.In addition,when the supplier provide core components to two competing manufacturers,which should be choose differentiated wholesale prices for different manufacturers.Furthermore,the wholesale price given by the supplier to high-tech manufacturer is higher than that of low-tech manufacturer.The investment in environmental protection technology will not affect the wholesale price decision of the supplier,but will affect the sales price decision of the two manufacturers.Among them,the high-tech manufacturer will adjust its pricing strategy according to market conditions and its own technical level,and the low-tech manufacturer will Increase product sales prices to make up for its environmental investment costs.Finally,we also examine the impact of environmental protection technology investment on consumer welfare.When manufacturers invest in environmental protection technology,since consumers are more willing to pay for environmental protection products,so consumers can obtain more efficient use and consumer surplus by purchasing environmental protection products.In summary,a three-stage game model is constructed between the supplier and two differentiated competitive manufacturers to study the environmental technology investment strategy and the impact of environmental technology investment on supply chain equilibrium,which can provide theoretical and methodological guidance for the supply chain competition and cooperation.The study also has some limitations,for example,it is considered that there are only two competing manufacturers in the market.In reality,there are often multiple competing manufacturers in a perfectly competitive market.Therefore,in the future research,the environmental technology investment strategy of the multiple competing manufacturers may be further studied.
作者
杨振华
冯展斌
沈强
董晓松
YANG Zhen-hua;FENG Zhan-bin;SHEN Qiang;DONG Xiao-song(School of Business,Jiangxi Science and Technology Normal University,Nanchang 330036,China;School of Economics and Management,Shanghai Maritime University,Shanghai 201306,China;School of Economics and Management,Nanchang University,Nanchang 330031,China)
出处
《中国管理科学》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2022年第7期164-175,共12页
Chinese Journal of Management Science
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71902079)
江西省教育科学“十四五”规划项目(21YB138)
江西省“双千计划”首批培养类哲学社会科学领军人才项目(jxsq2019203033)。
关键词
环保技术投资
市场竞争
质量差异化
消费者福利
environmental protection technology
market competition
quality differentiation
consumer welfare
作者简介
通讯作者:冯展斌(1987-),男(汉族),山东日照人,上海海事大学经济管理学院,讲师,博士,硕士生导师,研究方向:公司财务,Email:zbfeng@shmtu.edu.cn.
