摘要
针对由制造商与供应商构成的两层供应链系统,基于演化博弈理论和方法,研究在长期的协同产品开发过程中,有限理性的制造商和供应商之间的合作机制。首先,对合作的成本分担与收益分配机制进行了分析;然后,对监督和惩罚机制进行了探讨。理论研究、数值模拟和实例分析结果表明:双方进行协同产品开发合作的概率与合作超额收益和单独研发的收益正相关、与研发总费用和背叛收益负相关;存在一个最优的超额收益分配比例,使得制造商和供应商合作的可能性最大化;合作双方支付的成本与双方合作超额收益的分配正相关;在监督条件下,合理的惩罚将有利于减少背叛行为。
For a two-tier supply chain system consists of manufacturer and suppliers,cooperation mechanism between bounded rational manufacturer and suppliers through long-term collaborative product development is studied on the basis of evolutionary game theory.Firstly,cost and income allocation mechanisms are analyzed;then,supervision and punishment mechanism is explored.Through the analysis of equilibrium results and data simulation,result shows,the probability of cooperation of both sides has a positive correlation with excess income of cooperation and independent product development,and a negative correlation with total cost of development and betrayal income;there is an optimal proportion of excess income allocation that maximizes the probability of cooperation;cost shared by both sides is positively related to the excess income they obtaine;under the condition of supervision,reasonable punishment will effectively reduce betrayal.
出处
《中国管理科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2010年第6期155-162,共8页
Chinese Journal of Management Science
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(60574070)
广东高校优秀青年创新人才培育项目(wym09064)
关键词
供应链
协同产品开发
成本分担
收益分配
惩罚机制
演化博弈
supply chain
collaborative product development
cost allocation
income allocation
punishment mechanism
evolutionary game
作者简介
黄敏镁（1979-），女（汉族），福建漳州人，华南师范大学公共管理学院管理科学系讲师，博士，研究方向：运作系统建模与优化、项目管理．
