异议独董:尽职还是卸责被引量：2

Do Independent Directors Take or Shift Their Responsibilities Indeed When They Object to Violations?

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摘要通过构建管理层违规和独立董事监督的博弈模型,对独立董事的监督行为特别是发表异议行为与动机进行理论分析。然后利用2005年至2015年上市公司独立董事对董事会议案发表意见和投票的数据,实证检验上市公司独立董事提出异议的动机及其后果。研究结果表明,独立董事提出异议并不能降低上市公司的违规行为。独立董事与公司股东特别是中小股东之间存在着委托代理关系,权衡津贴和声誉实现个人利益最大化是独立董事异议监督的关键动机。独立董事声誉较高时,倾向于对上市公司违规行为提出异议;独立董事津贴收入较高时,倾向于不对上市公司违规行为提出异议。无论哪种情形,独立董事都希望上市公司违规不被发现。而在最需要独立董事监督的ST公司,独立董事可能选择更符合个人利益的行为方式:辞职。由此得出:上市公司独立董事追求个人利益最大化,他们提出异议的主要动机是卸责而不是尽职。因此,在公司治理中要充分正视独立董事作为理性经济人的事实,通过合适的外部激励,促进独立董事尽职履责。 This paper theoretically investigates independent directors’objection to violations with a game model between executives and independent directors.Based on the advising and voting data of independent directors from 2005 to 2016,we then empirically test the motivation and implementation of independent directors’objections to proposals.Empirical results show that the objection of independent directors is unable to prevent listed companies from wrongdoing,which is robust after controlling endogeneity.There is a principal-agent relationship between independent directors and minority shareholders.Balancing allowance against reputation to maximize personal interests is the key motivation for independent directors’objection.Specifically,independent directors with high reputation tend to oppose violations,while independent directors with high allowance are inclined to connive at violations.In any case,independent directors expect that violations of listed companies will not be uncovered.In ST companies where independent directors are most needed,independent directors prefer to resign due to personal interests.Therefore,independent directors actually maximize personal interests when performing their duties in boardrooms,and the motivation for their objections is to shift responsibility rather than take responsibility.In corporate governance,we should realize the fact that independent directors are rational economic people,and promote independent directors to fulfill their duties through appropriate external incentives.

作者吴伊菡董斌 WU Yi-han;DONG Bin(School of Economics and Management,Southeast University,Nanjing 211189,China)

机构地区东南大学经济管理学院

出处《现代财经（天津财经大学学报）》 CSSCI 北大核心 2021年第6期20-39,共20页 Modern Finance and Economics：Journal of Tianjin University of Finance and Economics

基金国家社会科学基金项目(13BJL002)。

关键词独立董事异议公司违规卸责 independent director objection corporate irregularities shift responsibility

分类号 F272 [经济管理—企业管理]

作者简介吴伊菡,女,东南大学经济管理学院博士生,主要从事公司金融与公司治理研究;董斌,男,东南大学经济管理学院教授,博士生导师,主要从事公司金融与政治经济学研究。