摘要
以A股上市公司为样本,本文实证考察了章程反收购条款对公司盈余管理的影响,并进一步分析法制环境对两者关系的调节作用。经过研究,本文发现:(1)章程反收购条款具有内部治理效应,章程反收购条款的增加会降低公司的盈余管理水平;(2)法制环境对两者关系具有显著的调节作用,章程反收购条款对公司盈余管理的抑制效应在法制环境差地区的公司中更为显著;(3)管理层堑壕和大股东堑壕降低都是章程反收购条款作用于盈余管理的路径,其中对管理层堑壕的降低表现出更明显的影响。
Take A-listed companies as example,this study investigates the effect of anti-takeover provisions on corporate earnings management,and further analyzes the moderate effect of law environment on the relationship between anti-takeover provisions and earnings management.The results show that,first,anti-takeover provisions mitigate earnings management.Second,law environment displays significant moderate effect on relationship between anti-takeover provisions and earnings management,i.e.in the companies with lower level of law environment,anti-takeover provisions reduce earnings management more.Finally,the alleviation of both management entrenchment and large shareholder tunneling is the mechanism of the effect of anti-takeover provisions on earnings management,in which the alleviation of management entrenchment plays more significant part.
作者
胡志颖
卢芳
梁上坤
张金楠
ZHIYING HU;FANG LU;SHANGKUN LIANG;JINNAN ZHANG
出处
《中国会计评论》
2021年第2期209-256,共48页
China Accounting Review
基金
国家自然科学基金面上项目(71872196)
国家自然科学基金青年项目(71402198)
北京市社会科学基金课题(15JGC176)
教育部人文社会科学一般项目(19YJA790032)的阶段性成果
中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金
中央财经大学科研创新团队计划的资助
关键词
章程反收购条款
法制环境
盈余管理
管理层堑壕
大股东堑壕
Anti-takeover Provisions
Law Environment
Earnings Management
Management Entrenchment
Large Shareholder Tunneling
作者简介
通信作者:梁上坤,地址:北京市海淀区学院南路39号,邮编:100081,E-mail:Liang_sk@126.com。
