摘要
以2005-2017年我国A股上市公司为研究样本,本文考察了控股股东股权质押对企业银行贷款的影响。研究结果表明,控股股东股权质押水平越高,上市公司在银行贷款时面临更强的贷款约束,具体表现为企业需要支付更高的贷款利率,所获得的贷款金额更小、期限更短,并且更有可能被债权人要求对贷款进行抵押担保。进一步研究表明,控股股东股权质押主要通过增加企业控制权转移风险、强化控股股东“掏空”动机、降低企业信息透明度这些机制影响企业银行贷款约束。
Using data from Chinese listed companies during 2005 and 2017,this study investigates how controlling shareholders’ stock pledge affects firms’ constrains in acquiring bank loans.Empirical results show that stock pledge of controlling shareholders imposes negative influence on acquiring bank loans,as reflected by firms paying higher loan interest rates,getting loans with smaller sizes and shorter terms,and facing more guarantee requirements.Additional tests show that the increased risk of control transfer,the enhanced"tunneling"incentive of controlling shareholders,and the reduced information transparency are the channels through which controlling shareholders’ stock pledge increases firms’ constrains in acquiring bank loans.
出处
《会计研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2020年第6期75-92,共18页
Accounting Research
基金
国家社会科学基金重点项目(18AJY002)
国家自然科学基金(71902009和71872010)
中国博士后科学基金(2019T12004)的资助。
关键词
股权质押
银行贷款
控制权转移风险
大股东掏空
信息透明度
Share Pledge
Bank Loan Contracts
Risk of Control Transfer
Shareholder Tunneling
Information Transparency
作者简介
通讯作者:童丽静,ljtong@bjtu.edu.cn。
