摘要
借助《资管新规》“去通道”的外生冲击,本文考察了加强通道业务监管对企业信贷融资的影响。本文发现,相对那些没有采用通道融资的对照企业而言,在《资管新规》出台之后,先前采用通道融资的企业获得了更多的银行信贷。机制检验发现,当通道业务压降以后,受影响企业主要通过向产业政策扶持方向转型来获取国有商业银行贷款,还通过改善增长和偿还能力来获得其他商业银行贷款。进一步研究发现,企业在获得更多的银行信贷后,信贷融资成本也会降低,但增发股票和发行债券等其他融资行为没有发生显著变化。在考虑调整成本之后,企业转向银行贷款融资并未改变企业的净收益。本文基于信贷融资视角揭示了《资管新规》的微观影响,对监管机构、商业银行与企业的行为决策均具有重要的研究启示。
We examine the impact of strengthening passageway business regulation on corporate financing decisions using the issuance of new regulation of asset management(NRAM)as the exogenous event.We find that after introducing NRAM,the firms that are involved in passageway business will obtain more bank loans.When firms change their business to the direction supported by the industrial policy,they obtain more loans from stateowned commercial banks;in addition,firms can improve performance to get loans from other commercial banks.Further tests show that after firms turn to more bank loans,the cost of loans will decrease,but other financing behaviors have not changed significantly.After considering the adjustment cost,firms turning to bank loan financing does not lead to worse net income.This paper reveals the micro impact of the NRAM from the perspective of credit financing,which has important research implications for regulatory agencies,commercial banks,and corporate decision-making.
出处
《会计研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2023年第5期78-94,共17页
Accounting Research
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(72032003)
高等学校学科创新引智计划项目(B18033)的资助
关键词
通道业务
影子银行
信贷融资
金融风险
Passageway Business
Shadow Banking
Credit Financing
Financial Risk
作者简介
通讯作者:靳庆鲁,acjql@mail.shufe.edu.cn
