摘要
企业短贷长投是投融资期限错配在微观层面的常见现象,降低企业短贷长投水平是继续全方位做实做细做好防范化解重大风险工作的重要内容。本文以2008-2020年沪深两市A股非金融类上市公司为研究对象,实证检验了非控股大股东退出威胁对企业短贷长投的影响。研究发现:(1)非控股大股东退出威胁可以有效降低企业短贷长投水平;(2)非控股大股东退出威胁能对管理者形成监督制约,在管理者偏好风险和管理者过度自信的情况下,退出威胁对企业短贷长投的抑制作用更强;(3)区分非控股大股东性质发现,国有非控股大股东退出威胁能显著降低企业短贷长投水平,并且这一作用在国有企业和非国有企业均显著,而非国有非控股大股东退出威胁对企业短贷长投的抑制作用仅在国有企业显著;(4)异质性分析结果表明,非控股大股东退出威胁对无长期资金缺口、存在非理性短期借款、过度投资企业短贷长投的抑制作用更显著。基于以上研究发现,本文为上市公司进一步完善股东治理机制、提升风险防控能力等提出了对策建议。
Short-term loan for long-term investment in firms is a common phenomenon of investment and financing maturity mismatch at the micro level.Reducing the level of short-term loan for long-term investment is an essential content and part of the continuing work to prevent and mitigate major risks in an all-round and practical manner.This paper empirically examines the impact of the threat of exit by non-controlling majority shareholders on firms'short-term loan for long-term investment,using A-share non-financial listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2008 to 2020.The study found that(1)the threat of exit by non-controlling majority shareholders can effectively reduce the level of short-term loan for long-term investment by firms.(2)The threat of exit by non-controlling majority shareholders can create a monitoring check on managers,with the threat of exit being a stronger disincentive for firms to take short-term loan for long-term investment in the presence of risk preference managers and overconfident managers.(3)Distinguishing the nature of non-controlling majority shareholders,we found that the threat of exit by state-owned non-controlling majority shareholders significantly reduced the level of short-term loan for long-term investment,and this effect was significant in both state-owned and non-state-owned enterprises,while the inhibiting effect of the threat of exit by non-state-owned non-controlling majority shareholders on short-term loan for long-term investment was only significant in state-owned enterprises.(4)The results of heterogeneity analysis show that the threat of exit by non-controlling majority shareholders has a more significant inhibitory effect on firms’short-term loan for long-term investment with no long-term funding gap,irrational shortterm borrowing,and over-invested firms.Based on the above research findings,this article proposes countermeasures and suggestions for listed companies to further improve shareholder governance mechanisms and enhance risk prevention and control capabilities.
出处
《会计研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2024年第2期138-153,共16页
Accounting Research
基金
国家社会科学基金重大项目(21ZDA040)
国家社会科学基金一般项目(22BGL100)的阶段性成果
关键词
非控股大股东
退出威胁
公司治理
短贷长投
Non-controlling Majority Shareholders
Threat of Exit
Corporate Governance
Short-term Loan for Long-term Investment
作者简介
通讯作者:彭睿,kellypeng0918@126.com。
