摘要
为了提高工程监理工作积极性,基于Holmstrom-Milgrom模型,引入声誉效应,建立声誉效应和显性激励机制相结合的动态委托代理激励模型。分析声誉效应发挥激励机制作用条件,并与未考虑声誉效应的委托代理模型进行比较。结果表明:声誉效应在满足一定的条件下,引入声誉激励机制能够增加业主的期望收益,并且能提高监理的努力水平。最后,通过数值仿真模拟验证引入声誉效应的合理性。
In order to improve the enthusiasm of project supervision,this paper introduces reputation effect based on Holmstrom-Milgrom model to establish a dynamic principal-agent incentive model combining reputation effect and explicit incentive mechanism.Then,analyzes the conditions under which reputation effect can play the role of incentive mechanism,and compares it with the principal-agent model without considering reputation effect.The results show that under certain conditions,the introduction of reputation incentive mechanism can increase the expected return of owners and improve the level of supervision efforts.Finally,verifies the rationality of introducing reputation effect by numerical simulation.
作者
余晓蓝
毛红日
YU Xiaolan;Mao Hongri(Changsha University of Science and Technology,Changsha 410114,China)
出处
《工程经济》
2020年第2期32-37,共6页
ENGINEERING ECONOMY
关键词
委托代理
信息不对称
激励机制
声誉效应
数值模拟
principle-agent
information asymmetry
incentive mechanism
reputation effect
numerical simulation
作者简介
余晓蓝,女,生于1989年,湖南岳阳人,交通运输工程学院硕士研究生,研究方向:管理科学与工程。
