摘要
运用博弈模型,探讨了地方政府碳汇供给政策与林业经营者行为之间的博弈关系,并量化分析了双方行为变化对彼此收益的影响和最终均衡收益。研究结果表明:企业购买林业碳汇积极性、地方政府林业碳汇供给扶持政策都对林业经营者碳汇供给行为产生重要影响。因此,提出全面制定林业碳汇供给扶持政策和积极构建林业碳汇需求激励机制的对策建议:制定全面的林业碳汇供给扶持制度,积极构建林业碳汇需求激励机制。
It discusses the game relationship between the local government＇s carbon sequestration supply policies and the forestry manager＇s behavior based on the game model, and also analyses the effects of both sides＇ behavior changes and the final equilibrium profit quantitatively. It shows that it has important influence on the forestry manager＇s behaviors, which includes the enterprise＇s purchase enthusiasm and the local supporting policies for the carbon sequestration supply. Based on the above analysis, it puts forward countermeasures and suggestions to support the development of the forestry carbon sequestration, which includes formulating the supporting system for supplying the forestry carbon sequestration supply and building the excitation mechanism for supplying the forestry carbon sequestration demand.
出处
《林业经济问题》
北大核心
2015年第3期246-250,共5页
Issues of Forestry Economics
基金
黑龙江省科技攻关重点项目(GC14D101)
黑龙江省社会科学研究规划项目(12E148)
黑龙江省社会科学研究规划年度项目(13H003)
中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目(DL10BC05)
关键词
碳交易市场
林业碳汇
供给
博弈
carbon trading market
forestry carbon sequestration
supply
game
作者简介
陈丽荣（1980-），女，山东禹城人，讲师，博士，从事林业经济理论与政策方面的研究，（电话）15945184436，（E—mail）chenlirong1980@126．com。
通讯作者：曹玉昆（1962-），女，山东荏平人，教授，博士生导师，从事林业经济理论与政策方面的研究，（电话）13604881358，（E—mail）cyklk@163．com。
