摘要
在中国证券市场中,监管者对审计师的行政处罚通常采取师所并罚的方式,但也存在重师轻所的情况。后一种做法是否合适,在业内始终存在较大争议,也缺乏相关的经验证据。笔者认为,与师所并罚的方式相比,重师轻所的做法并未对涉案会计师事务所的质量控制体系作出明确警示和惩戒,从而置身于该体系中的事务所负责人(主要施为主体)以及其他未受罚注册会计师(主要承责主体)的审计行为更不可能受到警示和震慑。对2003～2005年间的监管处罚案件的经验分析支持了笔者的观点,从而提供了重师轻所处罚方式具有负面后果的证据。
There are two practices by Chinese stock market regulators when imposing sanctions to liable auditors:one is to punish the audit firm and individual auditors,and the other is to punish individual auditors only.There has been long-standing controversy about whether the latter practice is appropriate,but little evidence has been provided.I argue that,compared to the practice of punishing both the audit firm and the individual auditors,the practice of only punishing individual auditors signals a weaker warning toward the quality control mechanism maintained by the audit firm,and therefore the top management of the audit firm and other individual auditors who are not sanctioned are less likely to be deterred in their misconducts.Empirical findings are consistent with the expectation,thus providing evidence against the regulatory practice of punishing individual auditors but without punishing the audit firm.
出处
《会计研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2008年第8期23-31,共9页
Accounting Research
基金
国家自然科学基金项目“基于注册会计师个体视角的中国证券市场审计行为研究”(项目批准号70602020)的阶段性成果
