摘要
针对审计收费越高、公司违规的可能性反而越大这一高收费与高违规之谜,通过构建审计师与经理人共生博弈模型加以解释:管理层为了掩饰公司的违规行为,通过收买审计师粉饰审计报告,审计师则基于自身的利益决定是否接受管理层的收买,故高额审计收费不仅没有促使审计师更加努力地工作,反而诱发审计师与经理人之间的合谋。利用2014年国家发改委放开对审计服务收费的管制这一准自然实验进行双重差分分析之后,结论依然成立。进一步的研究显示,审计师专业能力、公司内部控制、公司透明度以及市场化和法律环境差异均会影响合谋行为和公司违规行为。
Based on the mystery of higher audit fees causing bigger possibility of corporate misconducts,the paper constructed the symbiosis game model between auditors and managers to explain this phenomena.That is,management may pay off auditors to whitewash audit report,so as to cover up corporate misconducts.Then for auditors,they may accept the bride.So higher audit fees would finally trigger the collusion of auditors and managers.This paper made the difference-in-difference analysis on the quasi natural experiment of the National Development and Reform Commission in 2014 to deregulate audit fees,and found that,the conclusion was still valid.Further research showed that,auditors’professional competence,corporate interal control,corporate transparency and the differences of marketization and legal environment were all influencing factors in this relation.
作者
王可第
武晨
WANG Ke-di;WU Chen(Institute of New Structural Economics,Peking University,Beijing 100871;Institute of Finance and Development,Nankai University,Tianjin 300071,China)
出处
《山西财经大学学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2021年第5期102-114,共13页
Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics
基金
中国博士后科学基金面上项目(2020M670003)
关键词
公司违规
审计合谋
博弈
代理问题
审计服务收费
corporate misconduct
auditing collusion
game
agency problem
audit service charge
作者简介
王可第(1988-),男,辽宁北镇人,北京大学新结构经济学研究院助理研究员,博士后,主要研究方向是公司金融与资本市场;武晨(1995-),女,四川广元人,南开大学金融发展研究院博士研究生,主要研究方向是公司金融与公司治理。
