摘要
在重视信息公开,探索建立事中、事后监管机制的新形势下,证监会各类行政处罚监管逐步转向交易所非行政处罚监管,问询函机制的作用凸显。与以往文献不同,本文未研究问询函对企业行为的直接影响,而是基于盈余管理视角研究问询函的溢出效应。本文研究发现,同行业企业收到年报问询函会抑制本行业其他企业的盈余管理活动,当行业领先者收到年报问询函、行业竞争度越高时,问询函的行业溢出效应越强;非北上广深样本中,同地区企业收到年报问询函会抑制本地其他企业的盈余管理活动,法治环境越好、市场化程度越高,问询函的地区溢出效应越强。本文还发现当年报问询函内容与盈余管理相关时,问询函的溢出效应更强。
Under the new situation of emphasizing information disclosure and establishing in-process and post-event supervision mechanisms,the supervision of various administrative penalties by the CSRC has gradually transferred to the supervision of non-administrative penalties by the exchange.Moreover,the role of the comment letter mechanism is prominent.Unlike previous literature,this paper does not study the direct impact of comment letters on corporate behaviors,but studies the spillover effect of comment letters from the perspective of earnings management.This paper finds that if an enterprise receives the annual report comment letter,earnings management activities of other enterprises in the same industry will be inhibited.Specifically,when the industry leader receives the annual report comment letter,or when the competition in the industry is more fierce,the industry spillover effect of comment letters appears stronger.In the non-Beijing,Shanghai,Guangzhou and Shenzhen samples,the receipt of annual report comment letters by enterprises in the same region will inhibit the earnings management activities of local enterprises.The better the legal environment and the higher the degree of marketization,the stronger the regional spillover effect of the comment letters will be.This paper also finds that the discussion of earnings management can enhance the spillover effect of comment letters.
出处
《会计研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2021年第6期30-41,共12页
Accounting Research
基金
教育部人文重点研究基地重大项目(18JJD790010)成果
国家自然科学基金(91746117)
上海财经大学创新团队支持计划资助
关键词
问询函
盈余管理
溢出效应
威慑作用
Comment letters
Earnings Management
Spillover Effects
Deterrent Effect
