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风险导向型审计最优定价机制研究 被引量:1

Research on Optimal Pricing Mechanism of Risk-oriented Audit
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摘要 承担重大错报风险损失索偿责任的审计机构具有保险机构的性质。传统风险导向型审计定价模型只按纯保费标准收取错报风险补偿费用,显然低估了审计定价标准,因而会损害审计机构的正常报酬。审计机构应该在纯保费基础上额外收取不小于购买保险附加保费的风险补偿费用,而消费者也应支付相应的附加费用。审计机构通常具有随资产增加而递减的投保意愿,因而在资产规模小且风险资产比例高时,愿意支付一定比例索偿风险补偿费购买保险,向保险机构适度转嫁索偿风险。由于对上市公司等公开融资机构提供的审计鉴证服务具有准公共产品属性,因而有必要对此类审计服务采取强制性投保措施。 The audit office which bears the liability for the risk loss of major misstatement in audit assurance service has the attribute of insurance institute.The traditional risk-oriented audit pricing model only demands the risk compensation according to pure premium standard,which underestimates audit pricing standards obviously,and maybe impair the normal remuneration of audit office.Audit office should charge extra risk compensation fee not less than the additional premium on the basis of the pure premium,and the purchasers are also should to pay the additional fees.Audit office usually has a decreasing willingness to insure with assets increasing,and willing to pay a certain percentage of risk compensation as premium to moderately transfer of claims risk to insurance institutes when asset size is small and risky assets are high.As the audit assurance service for public financing institutions such as listed companies has Quasi-public property,it is necessary to take compulsory insurance measures for such audit services.
作者 吴谨誉 阮立东 Wu Jinyu;Ruan Lidong(International Business School of Anhui University)
出处 《中国审计评论》 2020年第1期70-78,共9页 China Auditing Review
关键词 审计定价 风险导向型审计 优化机制 审计保险 audit pricing risk-oriented audit optimal mechanism audit insurance
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