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盈余操纵与企业融资工具选择——基于中国A股上市公司的实证研究 被引量:12

The Earnings Manipulation and the Corporate Financing Tools-Evidence from the Listed Companies in China
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摘要 我国上市公司为了获得外部融资具有通过调整可操纵应计利润来提升报告盈余的强烈动机。本文以我国A股上市公司1999-2005年财务数据为样本,应用横截面修正Jones模型估计盈余操纵程度,研究了上市公司盈余操纵与权益发行、债务发行和留存收益变化,以及资本结构变动的关系。研究结论表明,我国上市公司不仅在权益发行之前提高报告盈余,而且在选择债务融资之前也普遍具有提高报告盈余的倾向,表现为权益发行率和债务变动率都与滞后一期的可操纵应计利润正相关,而留存收益变动与滞后一期的可操纵应计利润负相关。本文还发现由于受股权融资、留存收益变动和债务融资对资本结构的综合影响,可操纵应计利润与资本结构变动呈正相关关系。 Listed companies in China have strong incentive to manage earning upward by modulating discretionary accruals to gain the rights of exterior financing. This paper examines the correlation between earning manipulation and equity issues, change of retained earnings and debt issues, and leverage change. We construct the component of accruals using the crosssectional of the modified Jones model by data of Chinese A-shares listed companies between year of 1999 and 2005. The evidence shows that listed corporations in China have the positive discretionary accruals before issuing equity and debt. We find the positive relation between discretionary accruals and equity issues and debt issues, and negative relation between discretionary accruals and change of retained earnings. We also find the positive relation between discretionary accruals and change of leverage because of integrative influence on capital structure by equity issues, change of retained earnings and debt issues.
出处 《系统工程》 CSCD 北大核心 2007年第8期7-14,共8页 Systems Engineering
关键词 盈余操纵 融资工具 资本结构变动 可操纵应计利润 Earnings Manipulation Financing Tools The Change of Capital Structure Discretionary Accruals
作者简介 李小平(1978-),男,陕西神木人,西安交通大学管理学院博士研究生,研究方向:行为金融与公司金融; 岳亮(1961-),男,山西临汾人,西安交通大学管理学院教授,博士生导师,研究方向:宏观经济管理与可持续发展; 李宝新(1966-),男,河北唐山人,西安交通大学管理学院博士研究生,研究方向;公司治理。
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