摘要
分析师的外部治理对证券市场的有效运行有重要意义,有研究指出分析师的外部治理存在局限性,本文针对此问题,从分析师声誉机制、企业内部环境改善两个渠道探讨了加强分析师外部治理有效性的可能。实证结果显示,我国证券市场分析师关注能够抑制企业应计盈余管理,但刺激更隐蔽的真实盈余管理;单纯通过分析师声誉机制不能缓解盈余管理问题,明星分析师关注会强化企业以真实盈余管理替代应计盈余管理的倾向;而内部环境改善有利于该问题的解决,它通过降低关注成本等机制发挥影响,在内部控制达到特定水平后,分析师关注将减少真实盈余管理而不是刺激真实盈余管理,这意味着企业内部控制与分析师外部治理存在协同效应。
Analysts’external governance(AEG)plays an important role in securities market operation.Existing research points out the limitations of AEG.In view of this problem,this paper explores the possibility of improving the effectiveness of AEG from two channels:analyst’s reputation mechanism and enterprise’s internal environment improvement.Empirical results show that the coverage of analysts in China’s securities market can indeed restrain the enterprises’accrual earnings management(AEM),but stimulates more real earnings management(REM);the reputation mechanism of analysts cannot alleviate the problem;the coverage of star analysts will strengthen the tendency of enterprises to replace AEM with REM;instead,the improvement of internal environment can alleviate such dilemma,which strengthens AEG function by reducing the cost of analysts’coverage and then impeding enterprise’s switch from AEM to REM.This finding implies that,when internal control quality reaches a certain level,analysts’coverage will reduce the REM rather than stimulating it,suggesting a synergetic effect between internal control and AEG.
作者
左志刚
石方志
Zhigang Zuo;Fangzhi Shi
出处
《会计论坛》
2021年第1期101-121,共21页
Accounting Forum
基金
广东省社会科学基金项目(GD19CYJ05)
广东省软科学项目(2019B101001018)
关键词
分析师关注
盈余管理
分析师声誉
内部控制质量
Analysts’Coverage
Earnings Management
Analyst’s Reputation
Internal Control Quality
作者简介
左志刚,男,广东外语外贸大学会计学院教授,zuo_zhigang@163.com;石方志,女,安永华明会计师事务所深圳分所。
