摘要
针对在线音乐平台中优质内容独家授权引发的竞争问题,本文构建了由一个优质内容供应商和两个横向差异化平台构成的纵向博弈模型,研究纵向分离和纵向一体化优质内容供应商独家授权的机理和效应。结果表明:优质内容供应商独家授权与否取决于平台差异化程度和交叉网络外部性强度;一体化内容供应商更倾向于将内容非独家授权给所有平台,独立内容供应商更倾向于进行高质量投资;不论纵向市场结构如何,内容供应商独家授权时的质量创新投资都大于非独家授权的情况,独家授权并不总会导致消费者剩余和社会福利降低。本文启示是:相关反垄断和规制工作中需要考虑在线音乐平台的纵向市场结构和内容供应商的质量创新投资,从而避免过度干预。
To address the competition problem arising from exclusive licensing of premium content in online music platforms,this paper constructs a vertical game model consisting of a premium content provider and two horizontal differentiation platforms to study the mechanism and effects of exclusive licensing by vertical disintegration and vertical integration premium content providers.The results show that the exclusive licensing of premium content providers depends on the degree of platform differentiation and the strength of cross-network externalities.Integrated content providers are more inclined to license content non-exclusively to all platforms,and independent content providers are more inclined to make high-quality investments.Regardless of the vertical market structure,investment in quality innovation is greater when content providers license exclusively than when they license non-exclusively.Exclusive licensing does not always lead to lower consumer surplus and social welfare.The implication of this paper is that the vertical market structure of online music platforms and the quality innovation investment of content providers need to be considered in relevant antitrust and regulation work to avoid excessive intervention.
作者
李凯
刘智恒
温艳茹
Kai Li;Zhiheng Liu;Yanru Wen
出处
《产业经济评论（山东）》
2023年第2期59-80,共22页
Review of Industrial Economics
基金
国家自然科学基金项目“企业纵向控制策略的识别、机理及其效应的实证研究”(71873026)资助
关键词
纵向市场结构
独占交易
平台竞争
反垄断
Vertical Market Structure
Exclusive Dealing
Platform Competition
Antitrust
作者简介
李凯,东北大学工商管理学院,地址:辽宁省沈阳市浑南区创新路195号,邮编:110169,E-mail:likai@mail.neu.edu.cn;刘智恒,东北大学工商管理学院,地址:辽宁省沈阳市浑南区创新路195号,邮编:110169,E-mail:lzhcyjj@163.com;温艳茹,中国建设银行内蒙古分行,地址:内蒙古自治区呼和浩特市新城区海东路巨华世纪城聚泽园小区7栋101号,邮编:010010,E-mail:1451969373@qq.com。
