摘要
基于中国B2C市场现状,本文以Hotelling模型为基本框架,研究了B2C平台为阻止商家多归属而提出的独家交易行为的影响,并对独家交易前后B2C市场博弈过程进行了模拟。研究发现,B2C平台的独家交易行为会在一定程度上抑制市场竞争,有利于实施独家交易的平台提高市场份额,且可能提高市场中B2C平台的利润水平。从对两边用户的影响看,独家交易行为下的价格优惠能够提高商家剩余,但会降低消费者剩余。总体而言,独家交易行为对社会总福利的影响是不确定的,并非总是损害社会福利和经济效率。因此,反垄断机构对B2C独家交易行为在密切关注的同时,也应避免过度干预。
Based on the current situation of B2C market in China and taking Hotelling model as the basic framework,we analyses the effects of exclusive contracts provided by a B2C platform to prevent sellers from multihoming and simulates the game in B2C market with and without exclusive dealing by MATLAB.We find that exclusive contracts signed by the B2C platform and sellers have exclusive effects on competitors to some extent.It not only can help the platform which provides the exclusive dealing,but also probably improve the profits of platforms in B2C market.Furtherly,considering the effects on users from both sides,exclusive dealing increases the sellers’surplus and reduce the consumers’surplus,because the B2C platform will set a favorable price to attract all sellers and charge a higher price to buyers.Finally,in general,as exclusive contracts don’t necessarily make a loss on the social welfare and economic efficiency,its influence on social welfare is uncertain.Therefore,the antitrust authority should pay close attention to the exclusive dealing contracts of B2C platform as well as avoid excessive intervention.
作者
董维刚
林鑫
Weigang;Dong Xin Lin
出处
《产业经济评论（山东）》
CSSCI
2018年第2期18-37,共20页
Review of Industrial Economics
基金
辽宁省社科基金项目“基于双边市场理论的辽宁省零售业发展问题研究:以百货为例”(L12DJY061)
辽宁省经济社会发展研究项目“新常态下辽宁零售业转型发展问题研究”(2017lslktjd-20)
中央高校基本科研业务费项目“双边市场理论视角下的零售类平台企业发展:模式与策略”(DUT18RW106)资助
关键词
双边市场
B2C平台
独家交易
社会福利
Two-sided Market
B2C Platform
Exclusive Dealing
Social Welfare
作者简介
董维刚:大连理工大学管理与经济学部,地址:大连市高新园区凌工路2号大连理工大学管理与经济学部新大楼D328,邮编116024,Email:wgdxgn@126.com;林鑫:大连理工大学管理与经济学部,地址:大连市高新园区凌工路2号大连理工大学管理与经济学部新大楼D328,邮编:116024,Email:1842048785@qq.com。
