摘要
本文建立了一个电视平台竞争的理论模型。电视台、厂商和观众之间通过一个三阶段博弈决定了电视台的广告数量、收视费用(付费模式下)和节目质量。研究表明:虽然付费模式下电视台向观众收取费用,但是节目质量仍可能低于免费模式并且总是低于社会最优水平。当单个广告给观众带来的干扰成本和电视平台之间差异程度都充分小或者都较大时,付费模式下的社会福利比免费模式下更高。
This paper presents a model of platform competition between two cable TV stations. TV stations, producers and viewers play a three-stage game, in which the equilibri- um advertising levels, subscription fees （under the pay-TV regime） and program quality levels are determined. This paper compares the advertising levels, program quality levels and social welfare levels between social optimum, the free-to-air regime and the pay-TV regime. We find that although under the pay-TV regime cable TV stations charge subscription fees, the equilibrium program quality under this regime may be lower than under the free-to-air TV regime and is always lower than the socially optimal level. When both the nuisance cost parameter and transport cost parameter are small enough or big enough, the pay-TV regime is better than the free-to-air TV regime in terms of the social welfare.
出处
《经济学（季刊）》
CSSCI
北大核心
2015年第1期731-756,共26页
China Economic Quarterly
基金
教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划(NCET-11-0751)
国家自然科学基金委员会青年科学基金(71202127)的资助
作者简介
卢远瞩，中央财经大学中国经济与管理研究院；通信作者及地址：卢远瞩，北京市海淀区学院南路39号中央财经大学中国经济与管理研究院，100081；电话：（010）62288397；E-mail：yuanzhulu@cure．edu．cn。
