摘要
经过十多年的发展,同业存单已成为中国商业银行主动负债管理的主要工具,同业存单在全国统一的银行间市场发行,其市场竞争表现出不同以往的特征。本文采用2014—2022年同业存单逐笔发行数据,研究发现,同业存单市场竞争提高了银行主动负债成本,该效应随着大型银行市场占比的提升而增强。机制分析发现,银行间市场准入限制下投资人与大型银行存在较强的利益关联,使得大型银行发行的同业存单相对于其他银行具有明显的竞争优势,大型银行市场占比提升带来的竞争效应难以由不同银行的风险差异解释,同时引致了同业存单发行定价扭曲,使得二级市场交易利差相对一级市场发行利差显著下调。进一步分析表明,同业存单市场竞争的经济效应会传导至银行资产端,表现为表内流动性创造减少和表外流动性创造增加,银行风险水平明显提升,市场流动性补充与金融监管能够有效缓解同业存单市场结构与竞争态势变化的负面影响。为此,在同业存单市场建设过程中,监管部门应重视放宽同业存单市场准入限制,不断扩容市场参与主体,做好精准有力宏观调控和金融监管,充分发挥市场竞争机制配置资源的作用。
To tackle the growing complexity of liquidity management in the context of financial deepening, Chinese commercial banks have been gradually shifting from passive liability management to active liability management. In December 2013, the People's Bank of China issued The Interim Measures for the Administration of Interbank Negotiable Certificates of Deposit(INCDs) to expand financing channels for commercial banks. Over the past decade, INCDs have become an essential instrument for banks' active liability and liquidity management. Before 2016, small and medium-sized banks were the primary issuers in the INCD market. In recent years, due to the fierce competition in deposits and the pressure of liquidity management caused by financial disintermediation, large-sized banks have increasingly entered the INCD market. This influx has precipitated significant changes in the market structure and competitive dynamics of the INCD market. Considering that the market competition mechanism plays a fundamental role in the operation of the INCD market, this paper explores how the changes in the market competitive landscape of the INCD market affect the cost of banks' active liabilities and what responses should be adopted at the level of market construction.Using the transaction-by-transaction issuance data of the Chinese INCD market from 2014 to 2022, this paper finds that competition in the INCD market significantly raises the cost of banks' active liabilities, and this effect intensifies as the market share of large-sized banks rises. The mechanism analysis indicates that under the restrictions on market access, there exists a strong interest correlation between investors and large-sized banks. This gives INCDs issued by large-sized banks a distinct competitive advantage. The competitive effect brought about by the increase in the market share of large-sized banks cannot be explained by the risk differences among different banks. At the same time, it leads to the distortion of the issuance pricing of INCDs. Further analysis reveals that the economic effects of market competition in the INCD market can be transmitted to the asset side of banks, manifested as a decrease in on-balance sheet liquidity creation and an increase in off-balance sheet liquidity creation. The risk level of banks also increases. Market liquidity supplement and financial supervision can effectively mitigate the negative effects of changes in the market competitive landscape.The above findings have several policy implications. Firstly, the key to promoting the effective operation of the competition mechanism in the INCD market lies in continuously enhancing the depth and breadth of market participants. Regulatory authorities may consider gradually relaxing market access restrictions and expanding the range of investors in the interbank market. Secondly, regulatory authorities should strategically intervene by injecting liquidity into the INCD market to alleviate the market competition pressure. They should pay attention to the penetrative supervision of the banking business to reduce the damage to market quality caused by problems such as capital nesting. Thirdly, banks should focus on expanding the sources of liability funds and take effective measures to smooth out the impact of competitive pressure. They should avoid excessive risk-taking when facing liability pressure to ensure the stable operation of asset-liability management.The contributions of this paper are as follows. Firstly, it investigates the impact of competition in the INCD market on the cost of banks' active liabilities, which provides a valuable supplement to relevant literature on banking competition and liability management. Secondly, it analyzes how interbank competition affects INCD issuance pricing without underwriters, extending studies that include the pricing role of underwriters in the field of the bond market. Thirdly, it systematically analyzes the competitive advantages of large-sized banks and the causes of the pricing issues they trigger, providing clear policy implications for the development of the INCD market and the institutional reform of the Chinese bond market.
作者
金凌
郁春浩
李志生
JIN Ling;YU Chun-hao;LI Zhi-sheng(School of Finance,Zhongnan University of Economics and Law;School of Finance,Southwestern University of Finance and Economics)
出处
《中国工业经济》
北大核心
2025年第4期99-117,共19页
China Industrial Economics
基金
国家自然科学基金青年项目“城投债信用评级膨胀及其经济效应研究:理论、实证与治理机制”(批准号72401294)
高等学校学科创新引智计划“数字技术与现代金融学科创新引智基地”的资助。
关键词
同业存单
市场竞争
银行主动负债管理
负债成本
interbank negotiable certificates of deposit
market competition
banks'active liabilitymanagement
liability cost
作者简介
金凌,中南财经政法大学金融学院产业升级与区域金融湖北省协同创新中心副教授.经济学博士;郁春浩,中南财经政法大学金融学院硕士研究生;通讯作者:李志生,西南财经大学金融学院、数字技术与现代金融学科创新引智基地教授,博士生导师,哲学博士。电子邮箱:lizs@swufe.edu.cn.
