摘要
公司控制权可能被经营者滥用以追求自身利益,但它也可以保护并激励经营者为公司实施其作为企业家的独有见识并努力获得企业专用型知识和技能。双重股权结构会恶化控制权利益的黑暗面,但又能够支持其光明面。因此,双重股权结构的监管制度应当遏制经营者滥用该类结构损害公司和外部股东的利益,但同时不应当对经营者通过该类结构掌握控制权造成重大损害或限制。为达成这一目标,监管机构可以对股东投票权与剩余索取权的分离程度进行适当限制,也可以通过事件型日落规则将双重股权结构与创始人对公司的领导绑定在一起。不过,后一种监管方式会使全面禁止双重股权资本重组成为必要。与此同时,监管机构通常不应当采用突破规则和时间型日落规则。中国大陆关于双重股权结构的监管制度并未达到遏制控制权利益黑暗面与支持其光明面之间的平衡,其中的部分规则有待改进。
Managers may abuse corporate control to pursue their self-interests,but such control can also protect entrepreneur-managers’efforts to pursue their idiosyncratic vision for the corporation and to acquire firm-specific knowledge and skills,thereby inspiring them to do so.Dual class share structures may aggravate the dark side of the private benefits of control but may also support their bright side.Hence the regulatory regime of dual class structures should prevent managers from abusing such structures to harm the corporation and outside shareholders but should not weaken,to any significant extent,managers’ability to acquire control through such structures.To reach this goal,regulators may impose reasonable limits on the separation of shareholders’voting rights and residual claims,and they may also employ event-based sunset rules to bind together a dual class structure and a founder’s leadership of the corporation.However,the latter regulatory approach necessitates a total ban on dual class recapitalizations.At the same time,regulators normally should not adopt a breakthrough rule or a time-based sunset rule.China’s regulatory regime of dual class structures has not struck the right balance between curbing the dark side of the private benefits of control and supporting their bright side,and some relevant rules need to be improved.
出处
《中外法学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2021年第3期819-839,共21页
Peking University Law Journal
关键词
双重股权
一股一权
控制权利益
公司治理
Dual Class Shares
One Share-one Vote
Private Benefits of Control
Corporate Governance
作者简介
沈骏峥,华东政法大学经济法学院讲师。
