摘要
社区与居民作为突发重大公共卫生事件应急管理的重要主体,二者的紧密合作对有效应对此类事件具有重要意义,而二者由于利益定位不同,在突发重大公共卫生事件应急管理的策略选择上存在差异。本文构建社区与居民突发重大公共卫生事件应急管理的策略选择演化博弈模型,分析模型的均衡点及其稳定性,并运用系统动力学方法对模型进行数值仿真。结果表明,博弈的均衡点与博弈的起始状态无关,处罚参数、损失参数的提高,成本参数的降低可以促使博弈向社区认真负责、居民积极配合的方向演化。
As important entities in emergency management of sudden major public health incidents,the close cooperation between communities and residents is of great significance for effectively responding to such incidents.However,due to their different interests,there are differences in the strategic choices for emergency management of sudden major public health incidents.This article constructs an evolutionary game model for strategy selection in emergency management of sudden major public health incidents between communities and residents,analyzes the equilibrium point and stability of the model,and uses system dynamics methods to numerically simulate the model.The results show that the equalization point of the game has nothing to do with the initial state of the game.The increase of penalty parameters and loss parameters and the reduction of cost parameters can promote the evolution of the game to the direction of community choosing conscientious and responsible strategies and residents choosing active cooperation strategies.
作者
朱华桂
刘晗
Zhu Huagui;Liu Han
出处
《中国应急管理科学》
2024年第7期100-117,共18页
Journal of China Emergency Management Science
基金
国家自然科学基金“突发重大传染疫情关键期防控能力与管控策略研究”(72074110)
关键词
公共卫生事件
应急管理
社区与居民
演化博弈
系统动力学
Public Health Incidents
Emergency Management
Community and Residents
Evolutionary Game
System Dynamics
作者简介
朱华桂,南京大学工程管理学院教授;刘晗,南京大学工程管理学院硕士研究生。
