摘要
中国农地流转市场具有典型的"差序格局"特征。近来发现,熟人间流转呈现大规模市场化趋势,但尚无研究探究其形成机理。文章利用奥利弗·哈特提出的参照系理论分析了农地流转市场化的内在机制。研究认为,局部市场交易形成的流转租金,通过改变村庄其他流转合约的参照系,使得事先签订的空合约或价格区间与市场价格区间有重叠的合约,都会因为交易双方存在损失厌恶而显著提高违约损失或交易费用,从而诱发合约价格向市场价格收敛。在重复博弈的过程中,只要外部参照系变动造成的物理损失小于因损失厌恶所造成的交易损失,双方将重新拟约,并向市场价格逼近。引入熟人网络后发现,熟人流转具有放宽合约价格区间的作用,但偏离外部参照系仍造成违约成本和交易费用的增加。即,熟人间流转具有市场化的内在动力。本文表明,外部参照系是农地流转市场自发市场化的重要诱因,中国特殊的流转市场转型为参照系理论的运用及拓展提供了现实案例。
There exist typical characteristics of"Difference Pattern"in Chinese land rental markets.Recent studies show that the marketization of land rentals between acquaintances dramatically increases,but this phenomenon is under-analyzed.This paper employs the theory of reference point advanced by Oliver Hart to analyze the transitional mechanism of land rental markets.The analytical results indicate that the land rents in partial market-oriented transactions change the reference point of other transfer contracts in the markets,and then the empty contracts in advance or the contracts which have overlapping price range with the market price involve high default losses or transaction costs because of the loss aversion of transaction parties,which is likely to converge the contract price and the market price.During the process of repeated games,only if the physical losses caused by the change of reference point are less than the transaction costs caused by the loss aversion,transaction parties will redraw the contract and then the contract price will be close to market price.When introducing acquaintance networks,we find that land rentals between acquaintances can relax the range of contract price,but deviating from the reference point still increases default losses and transaction costs,which implies that the land rentals between acquaintances have internal motivations of marketization.Our analysis shows that external reference point is an important cause of autogenic marketization of land rental markets,and the special marketization of Chinese land rental markets provides practical case for the using and the expanding of the theory of reference point.
作者
仇童伟
Qiu Tongwei(College of Economics and Management,South China Agricultural University,510642)
出处
《制度经济学研究》
2020年第3期206-223,共18页
Research on Institutional Economics
基金
国家社会科学基金重大项目“乡村振兴与深化农村土地制度改革研究”(19ZDA115)的资助
关键词
农地流转
市场转型
参照系理论
重复博弈
熟人网络
Land Transfers
Market Transition
Theory of Reference Point
Repeated Games
Acquaintance Networks
作者简介
仇童伟,华南农业大学经济管理学院副教授,地址:(510642)广东省广州市天河区五山路483号华南农业大学经济管理学院705-2室,E-mail:15150561782@163.com。