摘要
文章研究了公司业绩与高管薪酬粘性,以及薪酬委员会特征与高管薪酬粘性的关系。结果发现,我国高管薪酬与公司业绩呈正相关关系,且存在薪酬粘性特征。同时,薪酬委员会规模越大、薪酬委员会成员任期越多、薪酬委员会成员兼任越少,越能限制高管薪酬粘性。此外,与国有企业相比,民营企业的薪酬委员会成员任期及薪酬委员会成员兼任特征对限制高管薪酬粘性起到更大作用,表明民营企业薪酬委员会治理能力更好。
This paper studies the stickiness of corporate performance and executive remuneration,as well as the relationship between remuneration committee characteristics and executive remuneration stickiness.The results show that there is a positive correlation between executive remuneration and corporate performance in China,and there exist characteristics of salary stickiness.At the same time,the larger the size of the remuneration committee,the longer the term of the members of the remuneration committee,the fewer members of the remuneration committee hold the concurrent post,the more the executive remuneration stickiness can be limited.In addition,compared with state-owned enterprises,the tenure of remuneration committee members and the concurrent-post characteristics of remuneration committee members in private enterprises play a greater role in limiting the stickiness of executive remuneration,indicating that the remuneration committee in private enterprises has better governance ability.
作者
姚成
Yao Cheng(The Institute of Population and Labor Economics,Chinese Academy of Social Sciences,Beijing100102,China;Audit Department,Chongqing Normal University,Chongqing404100,China)
出处
《统计与决策》
CSSCI
北大核心
2019年第17期176-180,共5页
Statistics & Decision
关键词
薪酬委员会特征
公司业绩
高管薪酬粘性
remuneration committee characteristics
corporate performance
stickiness of executive remuneration
作者简介
姚成(1968—),男,四川南充人,博士研究生,研究方向:宏观经济学、人力资源管理。
