摘要
提高高管薪酬业绩敏感性要结合公司治理结构的优化。以A股上市公司为样本,研究市场化债转股对高管激励的影响。研究发现:相对于非市场化债转股公司来说,市场化债转股公司的高管薪酬业绩敏感性较高;且市场化债转股后,公司高管薪酬业绩敏感性也得到了提高。结果表明,市场化债转股有助于提高公司高管的激励效应。
To improve the performance sensibility of senior executive compensation needs to combine with the optimization of corporate governance structure.Using China’s A-share listed companies as samples,the paper studies the effect of market-based debt-to-equity swap on senior executive incentive.Study shows that the performance sensibility of senior executive compensation of market-based debt-to-equity swap companies is higher than that of the non-market-based debt-to-equity swap companies.Besides,the performance sensibility of senior executive compensation is improved after swapping debt to equity.The results show that market-based debt-to-equity swap is beneficial to the incentive effect of senior executives.
作者
李志军
陈龙
LI Zhi-jun;CHEN Long(School of Economics and Trade,Hunan University of Technology,Zhuzhou 412007,China;School of Accounting,Hunan Vocational College of Commerce,Changsha 410205,China)
出处
《云南财经大学学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2020年第12期64-74,共11页
Journal of Yunnan University of Finance and Economics
基金
湖南创新型省份建设专项“债转股的公司治理效应研究”(2020JJ4384)
关键词
市场化债转股
公司业绩
高管薪酬
业绩敏感性
Market-based Debt-to-equity Swap
Corporate Performance
Senior Executive Compensation
Performance Sensitivity
作者简介
李志军(1973-),男,湖南溆浦人,湖南工业大学经济贸易学院、湖南商务职业技术学院会计学院正高级会计师,博士,硕士生导师,中南大学、湖南师范大学兼职硕士生导师,研究方向为会计理论、审计理论;陈龙(1996-),男,湖南浏阳人,湖南工业大学经济贸易学院硕士研究生,研究方向为财务管理。
