摘要
伙伴间冲突普遍存在于战略联盟中,如何根据冲突的不同类型选取与之匹配的治理机制对联盟后续的运营与发展至关重要。本文结合交易成本理论与社会交换理论,探究不同类型的伙伴间冲突(建设性冲突与破坏性冲突)对联盟治理机制(契约治理机制与关系治理机制)选择倾向性的差异性影响,并进一步检验外部环境不确定性及伙伴行为不确定性对上述选择决策的权变作用。选取国内制造业企业联盟数据进行实证分析发现:当联盟面临建设性冲突时,合作伙伴更倾向于选择关系治理机制;而当联盟面临破坏性冲突时,合作伙伴更倾向于选择契约治理机制。环境不确定性显著加强了建设性冲突与关系治理机制选择倾向性间的关系,而行为不确定性显著增强了破坏性冲突与契约治理机制选择倾向性间的关系。本文研究结论丰富了联盟治理机制动态调整的理论研究,也为联盟企业在不同情境下对联盟治理机制进行适应性调整提供了指导建议。
The alliance governance mechanism can maintain the partnership and ensure the stability of the alliance by clarifying the partners’responsibilities and key tasks and providing appropriate incentives and penalties,as well as offering appropriate incentives and penalties.At the early stage of the alliance,the partners have established an alliance governance mechanism.However,emergencies or changes in the internal and external environment during the alliance’s lifecycle can lead to a mismatch between the initial governance structure and the evolving alliance dynamics.It is common for partners in the alliance to have conflicts with each other.When a conflict occurs,the original alliance governance may no longer be applicable,and it is necessary to adapt the alliance gover nance to promote the sustainable and development of the alliance.There are two types of conflicts between partners:constructive and destructive.The choice of alliance governance mechanisms is different due to the differences in sources and characteristics between these two types of conflicts.Therefore,It is crucial to select the appropriate governance for different types of conflicts in order to en-sure the alliance’s subsequent operation and long-term development.Integrating transaction cost theory and social exchange theory,this study examines how different types of interpartner conflict(i.e.constructive conflict and destructive conflict)influence the post-formation selection decisions of alliance governance mechanisms(i.e.contractual governance mechanisms and relationship governance mechanisms),and further explores how environmental uncertainty and behaviorial uncertainty moderate the impact of conflict on the selection preferences of alliance governance mechanisms.Findings from Chinese manufacutring firms suggest that when there is constructive conflict within the alliance,alliance partners are more in-clined to select relationship governance mechanisms.When there is destructive conflict among alliance partners,they are more likely to choose formal governance mechanisms.We also find that environmental uncertainty positively moderates the relationship between constructive conflict and selection of relationship governance mechanisms,while behavioral uncertainty positively moderates the re-lationship between destructive conflict and selection of formal governance mechanisms.This study contributes to the literature in three ways.First,our study highlights the asymmetric effects of constructive and destruc-tive conflicts on the alliance governance mechanism’s selection preferences.By demonstrating how alliance governance mechanisms adapt in the context of interpartner conflict,our study contributes to the literature on alliance governance.Second,our study focuses on the moderating effect of environmental uncertainty and behavioral uncertainty,which aid in defining the extent to which conflict affects the selection preferences of alliance governance mechanisms.By expanding the boundary conditions for the interpartner con-flict,this study provides a more comprehensive depiction of the context in which alliances evolve.Third,by investigating the impact of interpartner conflict on alliance governance mechanisms,we expand the scope of transaction cost theory and social exchange theory in the field of strategic alliance.This study enhances the perspective of transaction cost theory with social exchange theory,extending the new application of transaction cost theory and social exchange theory in the context of alliance conflicts.We investigate the effect of interpartner conflict on the ex-post alliance governance mechanisms’selection preferences through logi-cal construction and empirical analysis.In the meantime,we attempt to clarify the boundaries of governance mechanisms’selection preferences in different conflict scenarios.This study expands the scope of knowledge about the dynamics of alliance governance,deepens the theoretical understanding of the alliance governance mechanism,and offers practical guidance on how Chinese firms can transform and adjust their alliance governance practices.
作者
江旭
侯春青
王楚凡
Jiang Xu;Hou Chunqing;Wang Chufan
出处
《南开管理评论》
CSSCI
北大核心
2024年第3期71-81,I0013,I0014,共13页
Nankai Business Review
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(72272121)
电工材料电气绝缘全国重点实验室 GFJG 培育—面上项目(EIPE23120)资助。
关键词
冲突
联盟治理机制
选择倾向性
不确定性
Conflict
Alliance Governance Mechanisms
Selection Preferences
Uncertainty
作者简介
江旭,西安交通大学管理学院教授、博士生导师、博士,研究方向为战略管理、联盟与网络、创新与创业、企业绿色发展;通讯作者:侯春青,西安交通大学管理学院博士研究生,研究方向为战略联盟管理及治理;王楚凡,西安交通大学管理学院硕士,研究方向为联盟管理。
