摘要
针对学校出现的食品安全事件,运用演化博弈论构建校园食堂、学校和地方监管部门三方演化博弈模型,分析三方的演化均衡策略、影响因素和选择机制。研究表明,校园食堂提供安全食品策略是保障校园食品安全的关键因素,政府处罚力度和校园食堂违规超额收益的变化影响校园食品安全的演化。监管部门加大处罚力度、减少校园食堂违规超额收益、推动地方监管部门与学校治理深度融合是提高多个主体协同共治校园食品安全的有效措施。
In order to explore the campus food safety supervision in response to food safety incidents in schools,a tripartite evolutionary game model for campus canteens,schools,and local regulatory authorities is set up by evolutionary game theory,and the evolutionary equilibrium strategies,influencing factors,and selection mechanisms of the three parties are analyzed.It points out that the provision of safe food in campus canteens is a key factor to ensure campus food safety.The evolution of campus food safety is influenced by changes in government penalties and the excessive profits gained from violations by campus canteens.These are effective measures that increase the strength of penalties by regulatory authorities,reduce excessive profits from violations in campus canteens,and promote deep integration between local regulatory departments and school management.
作者
张嘉和
ZHANG Jiahe(College of Food Science and Nutritional Engineering,China Agricultural University,Beijing 100083)
出处
《食品工业》
CAS
2024年第4期330-335,共6页
The Food Industry
关键词
校园食品安全
协同共治
演化博弈
多主体
campus food safety
collaborative governance
evolutionary game
multi-agent
