摘要
文中基于文化生态保护区旅游发展的视角,在对文化生态保护区实际发展现状开展实地调研后,构建地方政府、旅游企业及保护区民众三方演化博弈模型,分析三者行为的演化路径。结果表明:演化稳定策略受收益、成本、政府奖励与惩罚的影响;相较于惩罚力度,旅游企业对自身损失更加敏感;政府通过优化政府监管成本制度、加大对违反秩序旅游企业的损失力度及降低保护区民众的参与成本等途径,有利于保护区旅游可持续发展。
Based on the background of tourism development in cultural ecological protection areas,we conducted a field research on the actual development status in cultural ecological protection zones,and constructed a tripartite evolutionary game model including local government,tourism enterprises and local citizens,and analyzed the evolutionary path.The results show that evolutionary stable strategy is affected by revenue,cost,government reward and punishment.Compared with punishment,tourism enterprises are more sensitive to their own losses,and the government is conducive to the sustainable development of tourism in protected areas by optimizing the government supervision cost system,increasing the loss of tourism enterprises that violate the order,and reducing the participation cost of the local citizens.
作者
何琪敏
谈国新
郑淞尹
史中超
王俊
HE Qimin;TAN Guoxin;ZHENG Songyin;SHI Zhongchao;WANG Jun(National Research Center of Cultural Industry,Central China Normal University,Wuhan 430079;School of Management Science and Engineering,Chongqing Technology and Business University,Chongqing 400067 China;Environmental Studies,Tokyo City University,Tokyo 1588557,Japan)
出处
《干旱区资源与环境》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2023年第9期180-189,共10页
Journal of Arid Land Resources and Environment
基金
文化和旅游部科技教育司项目(XM0920190583)
云南省教育厅项目(XM0120200552)
湖北省重大科技创新计划项目(KJ02052018-0639)资助。
关键词
文化生态保护区
旅游业
多元主体
演化博弈
仿真分析
cultural ecological protection zone
tourism
multiple subjects
evolutionary game
simulation analysis
作者简介
何琪敏(1996-),女,汉族,安徽潜山人,博士研究生,主要从事非物质文化遗产保护方面的研究。E-mail:qmhe213@163.com;通讯作者:谈国新(1964-),男,汉族,江苏溧阳人,教授,博士生导师,主要从事文化与科技融合方面的研究。E-mail:gxtan@ccnu.edu.cn。
