B2C网络平台嵌入风险控制的三方演化博弈分析被引量：15

A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysison Embedded Risk Controlling in B2C Network Platform

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摘要随着B2C网络平台的发展,嵌入商户的刷单炒信、假冒伪劣等行为给平台企业带来的嵌入风险越来越明显。基于入驻商家和消费者的双重嵌入性、参与者行为的交互影响以及有限理性的假设条件,本文构建了包含"网络平台—入驻商家—消费者"的嵌入风险演化博弈模型,运用演化博弈理论和李雅普诺夫判别法分析了均衡点的渐近稳定性及系统的演化稳定策略,并使用MATLAB软件对三方主体行为策略的演化过程进行仿真分析。结果表明:嵌入风险的演化是各利益相关主体博弈互动的结果;降低监管成本、加大违规行为的惩罚力度、提高违规成本有助于推动系统向理想策略演化。因此,B2C网络平台可通过优化算法降低监管成本、建立多方共治体系加大监管力度、提高违规成本以及优化维权机制等方式对嵌入风险进行控制。 With the development of B2 C network platform,the embedded risks originated from irregularities of embedded merchants,such as"false transaction and credit standing","forged and fake commodity",is becoming more and more obvious.Based on dual embeddedness of merchants and consumers,the interaction of participants’behavior and limited rationality,an evolutionary game model composed of"network platform-embedded merchants-consumers"is constructed.The asymptotic stability of equilibrium points and the evolutionary stable strategies of the system are analyzed by evolutionary game theory and Lyapunov diagnostic method.The evolution of tripartite behavior strategy is simulated and analyzed by MATLAB.The results show that reducing regulation costs,increasing penalties for irregularities and increasing violation costs can promote the evolution of the system to ideal strategies.Therefore,B2C network platform can control the embedded risks by optimizing algorithms to reduce regulatory costs,establishing a multi-party co-governance system to increase regulatory efforts,increasing violation costs and improving safeguarding rights mechanisms.

作者彭正银王永青韩敬稳 Peng Zhengyin;Wang Yongqing;Han Jingwen(School of Business,Tianjin University of Finance and Economics,Tianjin 300222;School of Accounting,Nanjing Audit University,Nanjing 211815;School of Technology,Tianjin University of Finance and Economics,Tianjin 300222)

机构地区天津财经大学商学院南京审计大学会计学院天津财经大学理工学院

出处《管理评论》 CSSCI 北大核心 2021年第4期147-159,共13页 Management Review

基金国家自然科学基金面上项目(71772134) 国家自然科学基金重点项目(1533002)

关键词 B2C网络平台三方演化博弈嵌入风险双重嵌入仿真 B2C network platform tripartite evolutionary game embedded risks dual embeddedness simulation

分类号 F724.6 [经济管理—产业经济] F224.32 [经济管理—国民经济]

作者简介彭正银,天津财经大学商学院教授,博士生导师,博士;通讯作者:王永青,南京审计大学会计学院讲师,博士;韩敬稳,天津财经大学理工学院副教授,博士。